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張貼者:2008年8月7日 上午12:38Franky Fan   [ 已更新 2008年8月7日 上午12:59 ]

2006年11月


股市大跌560點及防守性投資:

近半年個市狂升。作為價值投資者,做的是就是繼續做自己的事,這是價值投資者的定義嘛,Focus on fundmental。身邊很多人想投資,又怕股災,咁點算好呢?我其實都唔知點可以避過股災,但我可以講講我依家既一點部署及想法。

首先,點解股票會升呢?

很 多人想持有股票,而在現價有較少人賣,人們競價而上,股價就會升,慢慢形成Trend,吸引投機客參與。越多投機客參與,或基本面越強,個Trend越穩 固。趨勢可以把股票價格帶離其基本因素可支持的點,但究竟怎樣才算是”高估”了,則其實視乎大家怎樣”演釋”這公司的基本因素。

我們喜歡合 理化我們的希望。現在的基本因素是客觀的,未來的基本因素是模糊的。人們怎樣演釋未來,便成了人們怎樣去解釋其買賣原因。例如,因為中國好,所以中國零售 好,寶芝是中國零售,所以寶芝好。這就等於說,巴菲特係人,你也是人,所以你就是巴菲特。這種單純的三段謬證往往導致很多決策的悲劇。

基本 因素是複雜的,我們需要有好的分類(Catagorization)去分析公司。用越多角度去看一間公司,便越能把公司分類起來。一個好的分類才能把不同 公司的基本面作出比較及配合現在的環境時勢。中國好-中國零售好-寶芝好,中間出現著巨大的差異,中國好,是什麼好呢?中國零售,是指什麼零售呢?中國零 售好,但競爭者多10倍,那寶芝是否還好呢?可惜,銷售、研發、戰略、價值鏈、供應鏈、人事、宣傳、組織結構、宏觀經濟、行業特質、業務特質、公司生命週 期、產品結構及對象、消費特質等等,總是讓人感到乏味及頭痛。還不如一個中國好那麼簡單。

當人們有了中國好的三段論證,就會購買股票,加上趨勢讓所有參與遊戲的人都會賺錢,所以讓人們對自己的”分析”更有信心,股價上升勝過一切複雜分析 的結論。讓人喜歡的股票,總是Self-fulfilling地讓人喜歡。人們都相信好好。

基 本因素如何,人們如何演釋,實際上是存在很大的鴻溝。即使基本因素如何地好,在熱門股狂升之時,股價不升就是”廢”股。市場選股的模式已由升跌去主導,升 的股票就會升,不升的股票就是不升,總是有原因去解釋的。當熱門股被炒到傻瓜也感到懷疑時,資金總要流去一些比較安全的地方。因此,久不久便會有基本面好 的股票被人”發現”,由”廢股”變成undervalued。之後,上升的原因接踵而來,價值反影,自我完成。

那麼,股災的時候,有什麼會跌呢?

股 災不能預測的。即使Jesse Livermoore也能感到市場購買力弱,但是否股災,則要視否情況。他會用資金衝擊市場,看看效果如何,軟弱無力的就再加倍沽空,造成股災。你有錢也 可以試一下。至於,你問”究竟幾時股災呢?”,則我會問”你識Jesse Livermoore嗎?”

股災,是泛指主要指數暴跌。指數只是 數十間公司的Weighted Average。那些公司跟其他公司的基本因素可能沒什麼關係,但股災則制造了一個Signal-”幻想遊戲”完了。中國好三段論證不再成立,股價跌成為 了股價跌的原因。這時再用中國三段證的人將會受到教訓。

對一些股價去到傻瓜才會買的地步,例如一些長期受中國好三段證支持的股票,股災影響 很大。那些股票經過長期的上升,股東週轉了無數次,每一次都換上更樂觀及更單純的股東。當然,最後他們的反應也會十分單純。這是時候,誰會拯救他們呢?情 況就會音樂轉球,音樂突然停了,你是需要被罰的。無數,係你,無得話唔好的~

股東越能夠樂觀地幻想的,便會被拋售得越緊要。股災的恐怖,讓誰也不敢入市,但單純的人都想最快地把球在音樂停下來是轉給別人,但誰會樂意去接呢? 無得講架啦,係你了!

如果暴跌是回歸基本面的過程,那相信很多股票不會太受股災的影響。因為他們本身根本沒有人對它們有幻想,甚至有些根本在基本價值之下,例如業務優 良,息率強勁的股票。

至 於沒有人留意的股票,沒有經過中國好三段論的股票,較多股東本身沒有什麼幻想,較多股東明白公司的價值,而恐慌中的資金,又要找一些息率高,防守性好的股 票。佔少數的投機客股東拋出股票,佔大部佔的投資者及追求防守性投資的人,吸納股票。這些股價的走勢跟幻想型股票有很大分別。

昨天,恆指大跌560點。有些人說”今日股票跌很多。”,看來指數已代表了”股票”。對投機客而言,這是對的,大市不好,怎樣炒得起呢?然而,防守 性股票的表現如何呢?儘管看看我喜歡的一些選擇: 

157:0.94,-0.02 (高息增長)

1137:0.73, -0.02 (蝕錢股)

483:1.15, 0.00 (高息)

130:  2.1, 0.00 (高息)

408: 3.41, -0.09 (業務沉悶)

這些股票在指數暴跌時,拋出來的股票很少,很多時價格下跌,但成交量不多,而且在人們拋出股票後,看來投資者更顯得積極。今日恆指反彈141點,又 看看這些股表現如何:

157:1.02, +0.08 

1137:0.76, +0.04

483:  1.15, 0.00

130: 2.11, 0.01

408: 3.44, +0.03

這些股票在人們拋售過後,表現得反而更強。真正原因總是不能知道的,但我相信在幻想股在560暴跌後,總是看起來比較危險。我是投機客的話,也會慢 慢將資金轉移至較少幻想的股票。始終,音樂快播放完,球跟自己越來越近,還是在這時候離開比較安全一些。

股 市實在是太複雜,不同公司的基本因素又是太複雜,人的心理又是複雜,中間的鴻溝是如何的大?現在很多理論都只處理局部的問題,而太少考慮到不同情況,不同 因素互相影響的問題。很多的Parameters,產生者幾何級數的情況,加上不同的機會率,使投資成為難以有理證破解的黑盒。Linear Logic不能處理這些龐大的數據,人的Neutral network則比較有效率,最少大家也是幾何級數而上。訓練自己的腦袋,讓自己學多一點不同的”理論”,成為潛意識中的Parameters,加以練 習。久而久之,便能形成”感覺”,而面對感覺,聆聽感覺,又能讓我們找出一些理論的根據。三十六計說”機不可設,設則不中。”運用理論也一樣,要視乎情況 而定,而怎樣才可以在適當的時候運用理論,並運用得適當,及如何配合其他理論去看複雜交錯的事情,從而增加自己的判斷能力及成功的機會,則要視乎我們平日 如何訓練自己的腦袋,視乎我們對理論的適用情況而定了。多假設,多驗證,多思考,多更正。學習一切理論,忘記一切理論,聆聽感覺,並從感覺中尋找理論的根 據,我們才在此時作出決定。不過,這不擔保成功,因為我們正活在Uncertainty之中。我們盡了力,餘下的結果,只好學懂接受,冷靜下來,並走下餘 下的路。馬死落地行嘛~

2006年9月


給住好D的信:


致楊志超先生:

我是在港大聆聽你的分享會的一位聽眾。聽完這講座後,我有三種感 覺:感動、擔心、希望。我想藉此電郵回應你的分享,同時提出一些想法,希望可以幫助到你帶動GOD成為更具能力及貢獻的香港企業。

感動:
今天你說「住好o的」可能會給人一種不認真的感覺,但我本身喜歡這 個名字。首先,這名字明確地給顧客及員工知道這企業的價值。擁有一個定位,對顧客選擇及員工參與的投入度有都有十分大的幫助。我想GOD有了一個好的開 始。

很感動的是GOD對文化的重視,更貼切的形容是包容、尊重及欣賞。 我十分認同各地也有甚生活模式及文化,而且都是獨特、有趣而且具價值的。藝術的其中一個目的就是讓欣賞者可以透過藝術品體驗到藝術家的一些感覺。這點, GOD走在正確的道路了。

我經常思考,為何街上的人都用外國名牌的袋,而擁有很大個LV Logo的袋會在中國特別好賣,而同屬LV但沒有Logo的則不那麼好賣呢?我想中國或香港對品牌的追求重視奢侈多於設計。要靠外國貨來追求地位或身份的 象徵,我不敢肯定,但我想某程度上是出於一種對自身身份或文族的自卑感或迷失感。中國及香港需要找到自己的定位及價值,再熱情地維持及理行這些價值。這些 精神的滿足將成為文族凝聚力的來源,也同時有巨大的經濟價值。或許GOD可以這方面作一分力。

我十分欣賞GOD能就地取材及對使用者需要的關注。這種細心,相信 是對生活及顧客的關心。中國的生產力全球第一,可生產任何產品,但同時l中國人對外國名牌趨之若鶩。中國對產品的生產力很大,同時對產品需求也很大,但中 國本土不能滿足於自身的產品,而購買外國的產品。這是供需之間的錯配矛盾的原因。我相信未來能夠利用中國生產力及能適應中國消費者需求者,將會成為中國消 費市場的最大得益者。GOD在產生及滿足需求方面,有一個很好的核心能力,是一個難得的優勢。出自於資訊及文化豐富的香港,GOD 有一個很好的開始。

會上談到現代社會的特點是什麼,我回想起身邊的朋友,心中立刻想到 �迷失�二字。過去經濟發展,全民有一種很強的賺錢圖強信念。二十年過去了,香港經濟發展,年青一代在比較物質富裕下環境成長,圖強信念銳氣難續,前路茫 茫,有一種�輕不著地�的感覺。正如你所說,革命感開始萌生了,我想除了你跟我,社會不少人也發現了這現象。我的朋友無論有工作的、無工作的,抑或是不願 做工作的,不少都對未來感到疑惑。摸索,是獲得的開始,而這本身又是特色之一。迷途中,如果有人能道出重要的事情,將會能幫助迷途的人,從而獲得支持。 GOD可以是一個平台,與有志者發揮才能,為自己的顧客服務群作出貢獻。

擔心:
GOD有一個好的開始,現在的問題是如何將創意變成產品,將產品變 成利潤,將利潤變成大的能量,將能量變成達成企業使命的效果。我想像如果我是在GOD的管理層的話,我需要是一個明白GOD創作信念之餘,我同時還需要是 一個企業家。商業需要賺錢,但更重要的是爭取更多的資源去達成企業的使命,對員工及顧客負責,所以是十分有意義的。

零售固定成本高,貴於貨如輪轉。GOD的產品十分少量而多樣化,產 品由成衣到傢具,精品到廚具。我擔心的是,如此多的產品,生產、存貨、物流及店舖擺設如何配合去達致貨如輪轉的效果。Zara能將Fashion 少量多樣化地急速銷售,能夠達成企業目的之餘,還很具經濟價值,可讓它能將在更多的地方實踐自己。其中,Zara的物流及設計流程是很值得參考的。ASM 太平洋是香港本地極少有的科技公司,它從研發時,已經跟生產配合,員工多是多能工,熟知其他組織的考慮,值得參考。豐田汽車在日本發展初期,面對細小的本 地市場及多樣化需求,發展其獨得的豐田生產模式(Just-in-time),它的生產思考很值得也對靈活少量化生產很具意義。美國的Borsheim, 全美只有一間店,但其銷售額卻可媲美全美最大的Tiffany旗艦店,其郵購的直銷模式配合一店提供最多選擇,從而提高店舖周轉率,降低成本,回饋顧客, 每年的Catalog也成為選購手飾的重點讀物。

小企業是充滿活力的,成長的關鍵繫於企業能否將少數人的能力轉化為 整體企業的系統配合性。這些系統化,是權力下放、靈活決策及員工參與企業持續改善的基礎。我相信這是給任何小企業的最大挑戰。市場總是充滿著競爭,有利可 圖則吸引更大競爭, know-how難以學習者將可維持高水平盈利。然而,企業還要在適應市場口味及保持自有風險中取得平衡,企業對外及對內如何保持和諧及靈活,又是對管理 層的另一大挑戰。

希望:
香港的市場細小,增長緩慢,競爭激烈,就像是企業的鬥技場。如果可 在香港立足,是十分難能可貴的。如果系統化的管理已建立,在其他地方複製成功的話,企業場能進入高速增長期。經過艱苦磨練的企業,是十分有競爭力的。星加 坡本土市場細小,沒有如中國般的巨大市場作後循,卻出現了不少跨國企業及品牌。縱使星加坡的按摩椅並不能盡善盡美,但其經營及推廣的手腕,卻真的帶給市場 多一個選擇。經營能力的重要性,在麥當奴的漢堡包更能體現出來。

因此,如果有好的理念及產品,卻因為經營而不能發揚光大,實屬可 惜!作為中國最先進的城市之一,香港工業其實有責任作為中國經濟創新的先驅。如果GOD能將獨得的價值觀及商業模式帶給顧客及其他企業家,其價值是不容置 疑的!

希望GOD能夠繼續努力!穩步成長!為生活藝術、香港工業及中國經 濟作一番努力!有機會的話,保持聯絡!

祝 工作順利!
Franky

我的工作(二):戰略家


上次講到我的工作是商業格價專家,其實我同時做埋買手角色。買賣是 有趣的對戰遊戲,要在這遊戲得益,了解遊戲規則之餘,還必須知己知彼,才能百戰不殆了!戰爭是全盤的考慮,戰役則是短兵相接的過程。作為戰爭中的戰略家, 便要有責任在戰爭中爭取勝利,但這不代表要勝出所有戰役,更重要的盡量減少傷亡。要勝出,戰略家需要慎察形勢,系統地計劃,立於不敗之地,靜待事變,當機 立斷,速戰而勝!

戰術與戰略:
太多的討論都集中在如何在戰役中勝出,討論如何成為一個戰士,成為 一個英雄,如何向高難度挑戰,找出罕有的秘密,成為市場中最聰明的人。這種英雄主義是自我膨脹的投射。作為專業的投資人,要負上責任的話,這是不足夠的。 孫子兵法都有講,以小勝多的,不如以多勝小,我從不打算成為最聰明的智者,或成為最勇敢的戰士,或要找出最快或最秘密的資料。一兩次的成功並無意義,全盤 的勝出才是最重要的!投資是一場漫長的戰爭,不是一兩次勝敗便告完結,小勝甚致是大敗的原因。因此,經歷多了後,我慢慢對必勝的、高難度的、最秘密的事情 或理論都失去了熱情。我慢慢從把研究的重點,從戰術轉為戰略。

戰略是在漫長的戰爭中獲勝的必要條件,但並不是滿足條件。戰略的制 定都是在有限的認知下完成的,但世界卻在不停變動,產生很多未知因素,所以人算有時也不如天算。然而,戰略可以幫助我們處於有利的位置。如孫子所言:”善 戰者,立於不敗之地,而不失敵之敗也”,先立於不敗之地,侯機出奇制勝。投資也是一樣,跟著明顯的事而狂追猛打,或許可以讓我們勝出多場戰役,但深入虎 穴,到時不知能否全身而退呢!研究投資時,短期的得失是難有啟示的,得失背後的道理,才是考慮投資者能力的最重大關鍵!

任務一:慎戰
”勝兵先勝而後求戰,敗兵先戰而後求勝”-<<孫子兵 法-軍形篇>>
勝利之先決條件是生存,在戰役中陣亡,便不能在戰爭中獲勝!這並不 代表我們要回避戰役,但我們可以選擇只打高勝算之戰役,保存實力,勝敵益強。有些戰役目標是敵方要塞,勢難力敵,雖然獲勝的話,回報甚豐,但這往往只是虛 耗我軍戰力的餌,不宜強行。英雄主義式的祟拜在戰略上並不實際。我們要完成容易的事,而不是挑戰困難的事。如你投資上體驗過挑戰,相信你會同意我的說話!

任務二:察勢
”故經之五事,校之以計,而索其情:一曰道,二曰天,三曰地,四曰 將,五曰法。”-<<孫子兵法-始計篇>>
審察民心、天時、地形、將領及法令,便能得知勝負,進而採取行動或 變策。投資也一樣,考慮價值創造、宏觀條件、微觀條件、管理層及組織執行力,便能知道其發展,從而作出相應的決策。未來就像早已發生,而不是戰戰兢兢,祈 求勝利。當然,人算不如天算,萬物會變,但勝利往往不只繫於單一因數,事情難以全盤一時被推翻。只要適當調整策略,見微知著,在重大不利事件的徵兆出現前 便退卻。如果只靠單一因數而務求獲勝的,那戰略未免過於單純了,有待改進。

"善戰者,求之於勢,不責於人,故能擇人任勢。” <<孫子兵法-兵勢篇>>
股票是商業的一部份,所以投資股票定必要考慮其商業的”勢”,做得 不好並不能怪管理層做得不好,只能怪自己一廂情願的祈望不能實現。五事皆順,勢乃成,發展是自然之事,就像日出而光明,日落而晦暗一樣。

任務三:三明
"知己知彼,百戰不殆。不知彼而知己,一勝一負。不知彼不知己,每 戰必敗。”<<孫子兵法-謀攻篇>>

投資的成功可歸於三明:明事,明他,明己。明白貨物的本質,是謂明 事;明白對手如何看待事物的本質,是謂明他;明白自己的心理素質及對貨物認知的有限性,是謂明己。在投資中勝出,不能只明事,不能只明他,也不能只明己。 太多的討論在於事物的本質時,太少的討論在於自身的有限性。太多的討論在於揣測對方的看方時,太少的討論同時回歸到事物的本質。對單純明事或明他過多的偶 像性祟拜,排除異己者,是自我膨脹之表現,正是不明己也!投資如能達到三明,勝算可期!

明事部驟有四:一曰聞,二曰知,二曰通,三曰達。了解事情的現況, 謂之知;了解事情的生成,謂之通;了解事情的變化,謂之達。聞知通達而明,機之本也。機者,奇也,勝算也!

任務四:奇正
”兵者,詭道也!...攻其無備,出其不意,此兵家之勝,不可先傳 也。”<<孫子兵法-始計篇>>
”善用兵者,避其銳氣,擊其惰歸,此治氣者也。”<< 孫子兵法-軍爭篇>>

戰爭是對戰,勝負繫於勢,而勢又繫於敵我的戰略與認知。投資的行為 是買入,同時必要有人賣出。買入者,對貨物有所期望;賣出者,對貨物有所貨物之等價現金有所期望,或對貨物價值感到悲觀。

幸運地,投資的各參與者並不對所有投資也達至明的地方,很多只做 到”聞”或”知”的階段,不知事情發生的根本,更不知事情的未來變化。高明的投資者,先持有擁有不敗的公司,與時並進,再候機等待市場對個別不敗公司感到 冷淡甚至悲觀,出奇制勝!其實所謂”奇”,只是超出一般人”聞”及”知”的”通達”吧了!


任務五:待變
”昔之勝戰者,先為不可勝,以待敵之可勝。”<<孫子 兵法 - 兵勢篇>>
其中”等待”是一個非重要的關鍵詞,是戰略家的基本特質。待變在投 資中佔了日常工作的絶大部份時間,但這並不代表這時候的工作是沒有價值的。相反,待變的時候,正是審察”五事”之變化及投資的發展。同時更重要同時審察正 在發展成良機的公司。這些公司的數目通常遠超手中的持股。

投資之事,其行為是很簡單的,買入公司的數目也是有限的,但實際上 要包羅的情報、明事的智慧、察勢的經驗、待變的耐性及行動的決斷力,並不如表面看的簡單。這也是為何同一投資行為,有人可以傾家蕩產,有人可以富貴及人的 原因了。

任務六:速戰
”兵之情主速,趁人之不及,由不虞之道,攻其所不戒也。” <<孫子兵法-九地篇>>
”善戰者,致人而不致於人。”<<孫子兵法-虛實篇 >>

靜待察勢之時,當事情隨預算發展成良機,或當”勢”情有變,便應當 機立斷,作出行動。機現而後察,遲也!不察而行,敗兵也!不明而行,每戰必敗也!

戰略性投資者:
投資自身需要戰略性的頭腦,審察所投資的商業戰略更要戰略性的頭 腦。戰略性投資者需要擁有很強的情況能力,平日必須勤力搜集情報,熟讀歷史,知古鑑今。同時,也要知己知彼,凡事探求,凡事質疑,凡事計劃,凡是觀察,凡 事聯想。自身之清晰是行動迅速的關鍵,也是勇氣的泉源。條件種種,決一不可!

成為戰略性投資者,不能單純模仿戰略性投資者的行為,那只是冰山一 角,不能成事。更重要是獲得其思維,舉一反三。隨著解悟、體悟及徹悟,而後求頓悟,融匯貫通。最大的障礙不是外在的一切條件,而是自己的心啊!


simplythere@gmail.com
http://ihome.cuhk.edu.hk/~s027639

股災點算:


寫完<<我的工作>>後,很快便收到來信(寄了去我的招聘電郵), 問我只買不賣,那股災點算?這是個有意思的問題,也是FAQ之一~不同的人對這問題會有不同的答案,如果我想找一個傑出的投資者替我管理投資,我也會問他 這條問題。

我自開始買股票至今,我已不停地聽到很多看淡大市的消息,這就如看 漲的消息一樣地多。有不少預測者經常能成功預測市況,因為他們曾作出無限次的預測,事後再抽出過往準確的預測來證明自己的準繩度,十分聰明。然而,我的錢 不能等到事後才買入而得益,所以如果我要就預測未來股市來操作,我必需要有預測市況的能力,而曾要事前便要準確。可惜,我暫時還未能培養出這能力。

什麼是股災:
既然預測股市的能力不高,那究竟如何面對股災呢?首先,我想先談什 麼是股災。長期而言,隨著通脹、貨幣量增加及經濟增長,股票平均來說是上漲的。這在過去美國及香港的股票指數可以體現倒。因此,我想股災是一個比較大的下 跌吧~我定義股災為超過20%的下跌,例如1907,1929,1973,1987,1997,2001等。

對我而言,股災也分為暫時性股災及蕭條性股災。

暫時性股災:
暫時性股災是投資氣氛在短期內變差,原因可以是一些短期的不利因 素,如天災人禍、通脹加息及政治不穩等,無奇不有,但其間大部份經濟活動沒受影響,很快投資市場也會短時間內回復穩定,股票價格會大幅度彈升,最終的下跌 幅度可能很少,甚至倒升,1973年及1987年屬於這類。這類股災帶給投資者短期的損失,但對長線投資者而言,除了提供一個購物良機之後,並無損失,就 像超市的米大特價,如果家中有很多米,無錢再買,也不怎樣損失~我是喜歡超市不時特價一下的~歷史上,大概每六年便會發生一次,但個別時間表現參差,對未 來啟示不大。

蕭條性股災:
蕭條性股災通常不是簡單的投資氣氛改變,這更附上結構性經濟問題的 破裂,實質地破壞經濟活動的正常運作,伴隨的通常是經濟的長期慘淡,人們叫這做簫條。這種股災威力較大,而且急跌只是開始,之後隨著經濟變差,股票價格往 往陰跌不止,長期持有股票者的損失會異常慘重,例如1929年美國大蕭條,日本在1990年至2003年的長期衰退,香港1997樓市崩潰等。這些股災的 共通點是普遍的資產出現大型的投機泡沫,全民皆股,百業為副,投機獨大。往往這些資產泡沫是多年前的刺激經濟時,便宜並大量地提供市場資金,百業得水而興 旺,同時多餘資金遊向資產投機,投機循環不息,不能歇止,盛極而衰。之前百業興旺繫於資產投機的興旺,所以泡沫爆破後,百業也同時進入衰退,與資產互相拖 累,螺旋式地下跌,回復難期。美國1929股災,等到1955年杜指才回復1929年1000點水平;日指1990年股災,16年後的今天只及當時 39000點的一半;香港恆指1997年股災,1999年尾便再創高峰,但若扣除中移動在科網性的急升的貢獻,相信香港到今天在2006年才能回復。

這類股災隨伴長期的經濟衰退,令中小型公司的生存受到很大的威脅, 所謂的回復,其實只屬於有實力的公司,很多公司在這衝擊下,會一沉不起,甚至倒閉除牌。因此,很多在1997年投機的人,到現在還未感受到回復感覺。

賣出?之後,何時再買入:
如果因為害怕暫時性股災而賣出,即我們預測股市即將下跌,到時再買 入!這產生三個問題:
1賣出後不下跌,繼續上升
2賣出後下跌,但反彈
3賣出後立刻急跌
面對著1及2,究竟我們是否應該知錯能改,再買進呢?這會使我們用 更高的價錢去購買股票,沒有跌失金錢,卻損失了股數,這也是一種損失呢!更大問題的是,如果之前已害怕股災,那再上升不是更害怕嗎?你可以一直不買回。我 們可能可以在下跌後買回更多傑出公司的股票,但問題很多像我這樣的人也在等待在便宜時買入,大家都知這股票便回升。賣出可獲得買得更多的機會,卻附上失去 持有傑出公司的機會。最大的問題是,優質公司在股災後的表現未必會下跌很多,可能因經營良好及競爭對手變弱而擴大市場佔有率,或自身降低成本而帶動盈利上 升,吸引投資者在沒什麼好投資時紛紛買入該股,推高股價。

第三種情況,正如我們所料下跌了,另一個問題便是何時買入?買進急 跌的股票,我有這經驗!急跌使我心理上認為該股很吸引,但我知道急跌可能是有原因的,或者根本不能衡量會跌到什麼地步,認為現在是最低點所以買入,往往會 被困著了。我清楚這,為了滿足自己的購買慾及防止自己損失,我會只買1手。事後,我會慢慢下跌是有其道理的,結果也如所料,我的一手被困著了,我打算去股 東會食餅去賺回我的損失~但如果認真地買很多的話,便要食很多才能賺回了!

當然,是有機會在剛賣出後下跌,而下跌後又在一個好的價錢買進,再 在買進後回升而獲利,但相比一直持有傑出的公司,好像困難得多啊!

回避簫條性股災:
簫條性股災出現在資產價格暴升至遠離需求水平,財富效應及吸引投資 帶動經濟興旺,那時候的確是可以的確可以套現回避的。然而,賣出這行為並不代表著我們擁有預測簫條性股災的條件。要捕捉數十年才出現一次的簫條性股災,需 要極大的能耐及技術。這可以是一個努力的方向,純屬個人的選擇!我自身對泡沫的形成及爆破是十分有興趣的,但那還是興趣而且,暫時還未懂得如何應用。

價格急升時:
往往價格急升是導致想賣出的原因,這是因為實際已遠離心理上的合理 水平,但隨著時間的改變,往往便使升幅變得可以接受。如果真的覺得價格是很貴了,當然可以選擇賣掉股票,轉而投資另一些公司或持有現金。賣出傑出公司,比 買入傑出公司需要更大的技術。歷史上,我是經常賣出公司的,每次都是因為公司太貴,或根本發覺公司不是傑出公司,或發展了另一更好的公司了。幸運地,我沒 有太多賣錯了的經驗,錯誤有時也帶給我獲利。然而,我同時因為”太貴”而錯過了很多傑出的公司,這錯誤的嚴重性不比”賣錯”小!請體諒我在學習過程中經常 遇上錯誤而改過而作出的買賣行為吧!

結論:
”如果股災,咁咪蝕?”這個問題就像問”如果蝕,咁咪蝕?”語法 上,回答的人會被引導回答”不是”,然後作出解釋。我是實務的人,對答案是預設了的假設性問題沒有興趣回答,也不會落入這些語言陷阱。問對問題才能得到對 的答案。相反,思考無窮的可能如何影響我們,便真的杞人憂天,自尋煩惱了。如果真的太害怕損失,而又不害怕不投資而錯過傑出公司帶來財富增長的機會,那或 許投資根本不適合你!在政府或大公司裏,獲取一份穩定收入的工作,加上銀行的活期存款,其實也是一個不錯的選擇!

我的工作:商業格價專家


我的工作是投資。投資是什麼?不同的人會有不同的定義,所以很多時 我會被誤會了。我其實不太喜歡這樣,所以總是對表達自己的工作時,表現得十分謹慎。如果你有興趣了解我的工作,那現在我們先想像世界上沒有投資這個詞語 吧!具體而言,我的工作就是找出傑出的公司,在吸引的價錢買入。我相信持有賺錢的公司,我會賺錢;而持有傑出地賺錢的公司,它們便會傑出地為我賺錢~

是啊,我的工作是買東西!這跟去超市買東西差不多,要挑選適合自己 的,質量價格比超值的。當然,要懂得買東西,要知道自己想要什麼,怎樣知道產品的質量,而最重要的就是...格價!

為什麼要買入傑出的公司?很簡單,如果你需要一班員工為你長期工作 而幫助你賺錢,那你會想選擇一班優秀的員工?那你又願意給多少人工呢?如果找不到優秀的員工,那你又會用什麼價錢去聘請一些能力一般的員工呢?你會因為價 錢平而聘請一些沒有誠信的員工嗎?會因為價錢平而聘請一些賠錢的員工嗎?那沒有一定答案,但我鍾意聘請我欣賞的叻人為我工作,而價錢即使不會便宜不去什 麼,但合理的話,都Okay~

系統:
經過多年的時間,我已經建立起自己的工作系統,你可叫它 "Franky至抵精明眼”,或”Franky系統”。簡單而言,只要通過以下七條問題的考驗,我就會買那公司!大家也可以參考,我其實也是參考巴菲特 的,只是第三跟第六是我自己加上去的:

1我是否明白公司的業務嗎?吸引嗎?
3公司的擁有競爭優勢嗎?有那些?
3我知道那些競爭優勢的來源嗎?
4管理層有不斷加強公司的競爭優勢嗎?
5公司會有效地運用資金嗎?
6我知道公司會出現什麼可能的變化嗎?
7現在的價格吸引嗎?

起步一:自信:
五年來的經驗告訴我,原來好多參與投資的人,都是一頭霧水的,但都 可以生存倒,好運的升職加薪,甚至發達退休!因此,不用怕自己乜都唔識,害怕失敗,害怕好難,其實大家咁話!或許你跟基金或投資銀行裏的某些人差不了很 多!要起步,必先相信自己!慢慢嘗試,慢慢學習,烏龜也會跑羸兔仔的~

超步二:常識
任何事都離不了常識,所以不用理會那些複雜的理論及字眼,講的人可 能都不知道自己在說什麼的!我地其實日常生活就有買東西的經驗,我們是顧客,體驗過消費的過程~因為任何商業也好,都是考慮”需要什麼”及”如何供應”兩 個問題。這是商業的根本。

超步三:學習
當然要加強自己對商業的認識吧!這學沒有Syllabus的,也沒 有一個絶對的起點及終點。我覺得你不用先學懂商業的每一種知識才開始研究公司!每一間公司都有各自滿足的”需求”及其”供應”的方法,所以一間一間地去看 看他們怎樣做,便可以知道大概是如何做,怎樣才做得好~賺錢或不賺錢的公司都值得研究的,多看多想多假設多驗證,那便可以知道如何分辨~這分辨能力永遠沒 有學”完”的一天,所以如果未弄清楚便不去親身體驗購買公司,這是很難有進步的~一切我們其實未曾擁有,何以那麼害怕失去呢?

具體工作:
簡單而言,我的工作流程是這樣的:

1找靈感
2思考若要通過"Franky系統”,我需要什麼資料?
3尋找資料,組織資料
4決定購買或不購買,計劃買購的條件
5觀察
6合乎條件時,購買;或不乎合條件時賣出。
7回顧過程

如何找到靈感:
最多人的問題之一是:你是如何找到這公司的?其實沒有一個特定的地 方的,但我可以概括為以下七個方法:

1觀察身邊的事物(行街很有幫助,誰的產品好賣,就去研究它!)
2思考事物的發生(我日日飲蒙牛,究竟由奶牛到”蒙牛”,其中的商 業活動是怎樣的呢?”)
3新聞(報紙不時有財經的新聞,見倒有趣便去研究一下!)
4問人(直接不過)
5隨機
6選定一個行業,同行逐間研究比較(你可以由最龍頭開始)
7逐間睇,由A開始

第七個方法我起初覺得最荒謬,但後來卻是我覺得最簡單直接的方法。 我覺得這十分有效,永沒有使我失望!你可能會問:咁咪好辛苦?辛苦架,但一點也不痛苦~過程中你會學倒好多野,也沒有強迫你要很快做妥,而且最重要的是, 你不會錯過任何你找了很久的機會~自從我用了這方法之後,我從未試過找不到好的主意~

如果最後主意都通過了"Franky系統”,那我就會購買,之後觀 察~接著又重覆我的具體工作流程。

動態:歡察+假設+驗證+檢討
我的工作有一個很大的特點,就是自己永遠不能肯定自己做的是對的, 更不知道自己的方法是不是對的!好彩,我的對手也跟我一樣!有些人會明白這道理,有些人會不知不知吧了~對我而言,那是一個不停觀察,不停假設,不停驗 證,不停檢討的過程~只要進步了一點,這個循環便有其意義了~一年...兩年...五年...十年...五十年...總會變得利害的~到時,還是不知道自 己是否做對,但相信會比以前好得多~

堅定信念:
不同的人做事都有不同的目的及不同的原因,在金融市場也一場~有些 人害怕跟不上潮流所以便害怕參與,有些人則認為自己十分潮而最終被潮流逆轉所衝擊。當然,有些人是能不停乘風破浪的,但古語有云,欺山莫欺水...可能是 我膽小吧,而且天性對潮流既不討厭,也不害怕,怎樣做,都是個人的選擇而已~因此,我有自己的一套,而我做自己的一套,獲得自己應得的成果~一分耕耘,一 分收穫~成功便獲利,失敗便賠錢~十分公平~I like it~

樂在其中:
我的工作對我而言,是一種修練~它跟我的性格是很配合的~我是一個 很好奇的人,我任何事情的發生都有興趣,其中尤其對人有興趣,或許是我對認識自己及與人相處特別有興趣吧~因此,我的工作跟我的興趣是融為一體的~是很 忙,但卻很快樂,很充實~最重要的是,其中可以發現自己,了解別人。這能力不止可以幫助自己得益,而且也可以幫助跟自己”有緣”的人~有趣之餘,十分有意 義!

就業:
有志從事我的工作的人,其實隨時也可以開始。如果我八歲知道,我八 歲就開始。我認識最早開始的人是16歲開始的。然而,真係要諗清楚自己從中得到什麼?願意為此付出幾多?還有自己的性格及興趣是否乎合工作的性質~個人認 為自己的腦袋不停地轉,但不用什麼能量,但有些人則覺得腦袋不能自主地轉,或轉的話會很辛苦的話,真的要思考這工作是否適合呢~

這工作不用怕沒有人請!因為最少你會自己請自己,或者被家人聘用~ 傑出的商業格價專家就傑四葉草一樣,很少有的,但卻能帶來好運!當你是四葉草是,總會有人爭相去請你的~如果沒有,請來找我,我會給你合理的薪金!我的電 郵是simplythere@gmail.com!

結論:
這職業不錯,I like it~歡迎入行~大家互相交流~

Long Long Journey - Enya

City lights shine on the harbour,
night has fallen down,
through the darkness
and the shadow
I will still go on.

Long, long journey
through the darkness,
long, long way to go;
but what are miles
across the ocean
to the heart that's coming home?

Where the road
runs through the valley,
where the river flows,
I will follow every highway
to the place I know.

Long, long journey
through the darkness,
long, long way to go;
but what are miles
across the ocean
to the heart that's coming home?

Long, long journey
out of nowhere,
long, long way to go;
but what are sighs
and what is sadness
to the heart that's coming home?


Arrogant-Value-Investors-Syndrome:


Today, I have receieved an advertising e-mail from the Fool.com. There is a chart comparing the performance of GRWOTH, MARKET and VALUE. Of course, VALUE outperform the other two a lot. The conclusion is that VALUE approach is great~ I am surprised that Fool.com would propose such arrogant and misleading claim.

I believe value investors are the people who practise value investing. Value investing is not a formula. Instead it is a belief in economic value and market inefficiency. I don't understand how the effectiveness of different philosophies can be measured. There aren't just any official method of value investing.

How to define GROWHT and VALUE? Does value investing mean buying stock with PE lower than 5 or PB lower than 0.5? Does "growth" investing mean buying stocks with profit growth rate more than 15% regardless of price? Then the pools of stocks are screened by those criteria in order to measure the performance of those apporachs? Are they really mean that? If yes, I am really disappointed by the competence of fool.com. If not, I am really sick of their arrogance as value investor(as they claimed). It is okay to stick with what is working, but is it necessary to show that other approahes are under-performing value investing with their own "prepared" statistics?

I also worry about th beginners in investing who are not knowledged and experienced enough to understand which investment philosophy is the most suitable for themselves to believe in the so-called value investing formulas, to claim themselves as value investors and to believe their can outperform the market easily. Not knowing what oneself is doing is the most dangerous!

I don't believe there is a "the best" approach in investing. Investing should be a personalized according to their own belief, common sense, characters and interests. Value investing, growth investing, speculation or even gambling are all fine. They are tools. If one specializes in using value investing, that's fine, but why is it necessary to say the other tools are not as good? More importantly, do they really understand the other tools? or even their own tool? I wonder.

I claim myself to be a value investor since I start investing in 2003. But my investment philosophy are changing all the time. I think the ultimate belief is still economic value, but the actual method has been changing a lot. I believe there are many kind of value investors as if there are many kind of Christians.

It is not the first time that I see people who claim themselves as value investors to suggest their are superior than the other investing philosophy such as growth investing or speculation as they called. They first assume growth investing or speculation is something simple and then use examples or statistics to disprove them. To support their ideas, they use their own examples and statistics which are always unfavorable for the subjects.

I believe value investors deals with value of which growth is one of the variable. I don't understand growth has to be differentiated. Okay, perhaps they means buying growing stocks regardless of price. If so, is it fair to state their assumption of their claim?

Growth investing invite much less critism than speculation. Speculation is usually described as irrational, foolish(greater foolish), and not-as-smart-as-me. There are many examples of scandal and failures. But again, what is speculation? Are the examples and scandals all created by the same kind of people who use the same methods so that they can be so called collectively? I think at most, they can be called as human conclusively instead of speculators.

Interestingly, when I read books written by speculators(as they claimed), they seldom blame value investing and other methods. Perhaps, there are enough many different versions of speculating theory already.

At last,  Philip Carret, one of the masters of value investing, has written a book called <<The Art of Speculation>>. It is worth reading what to understand what speculation is as claimed by him.

At last, I would like to give some recommendations to beginners in investing.
1 Even under the same belief, the actual methods and thus results can be very different.
2 The definition of the belief can vary from people from people. So even the same phrase is used, they can mean very differently.
3 Even one method seems simply better, it doesn't mean you can do it easily.
4 We earn money by doing well, not just by doing better.
5 Masters are always great. Suckers always suck. Let's compare apple to apple.
6 Know what you are. Know what you need. Then be.
7 Learn->observe->hypthozize->practise->evaluate->learn again and enjoy.
8 Beware of the use of language.

中國REITs會加速投資增長:


中國最好不要在地產投資增長過快的時候批準中國REITs的出現。 地產證券化將加強地產商之資本運作能力,降低成本,加速地產投資。當地產商及REITs的股價及盈利能力提高及發展潛力巨大時,資金流入更會促進周期的成 形。儘管最後地產及 REITs的收益及股價將不能維持高增長而進入負反饋周期,但其投機性力量將會對中國的經驗帶來很大的不穩定性。個人認為,這正反饋周期未必成形,但在現 在地產投資過快的情況下,中國REITs的進程真的應當十分謹慎。


2006年8月


Questions for Interview with Bauhaus:


Strategy
1 Ratioanle of different business model in different geographic location
2 Geographcial spreading or penetration?
3 Is whole-sale business volatile by nature
4 What is the major challenge now

Franchising System
1 Transaction Method(Receivable and inventory risk beared by Franchiees?)
2 Franching Fee, terms, duration. And How to promote? Reversible?
3 Logistic, HR, IT, shopfloor design support?
4 What is the major challenge now

Production System
1 Vertical Integrated
2 Pull-Production
3 Logistic in China and inventory. (3PL)
4 Outsourcing Strategy
5 What is the major challenge now

Organization
1 What functions are centralized?
2 What functions are regionalized?
3 How the performance of cost-centres be measured?
4 What is the major challenge now
5 How many designers now?
6 Briefly speaking, how Mr. Wong allocate his time at work?

Financial
1 Low capex model, then how to utilize cash?
2 Guidance of marketing, HR and distribution cost trend.
3 Dividend and stock repurchase policy

Feedback:
1Moiselle (avoid niche market saturation)
2NB ( pure franchise play)
3Esprit ( Balanced expansion)
4Zara (Quick Response)
5Levi's (Focus on design and branding)
6China Postal(3PL)

Monday, August 14, 2006

卡森:


上年十月上市$2.55,近來跌穿$1後頻頻回購,引起我的注意。 往績PE3倍,p/b 0.55,中國競爭力強,或許受美國建築業冷卻影響而反應過激,所以想想看是否Cigarbutt。

一睇財務報表,使人感到驚訝。04年存貨周轉日可以去到217日, 05年有改善,但距離”有效率”還差很遠。05年Working capital惡化,即使管理層解釋己經買了保險,cashflow惡化的情況並不會改善。03-04年capex很大,導至Debt ratio兩年都達170%的危險水平,所以要上市集資。集資後Debt Ratio回落至0.55的安全水平,並說新的沙發工業區生產成本只是$0.9/平方米,比其他$1.2x/平方米大大降低。這是一個災難啊,一來要投入 資金去發展低成本廠房,二是低成本工業區將帶給其他工廠很大的價格壓力。

上年十月上市,今年六月尾便發盈警,說原材料年初至六月急升導至毛 利受壓。以存貨周轉日18x日計算,年初至六月的原材料價格應該未反影於中期業績之上。如果中期業績己見受壓,下半年業績更是危險。

卡森04年的其他收入中,有原材料買賣的項目,是毛利1/3,達 $1.3億,05年大幅降降低至$29m。這項目使我懷疑卡森是否進行原材料炒賣活動,甚至原材料急升為中期業績盈警的原因是否合理。

卡森的現金需求龐大,營運資金及資本開支未見可大幅降低。業務高速 增長達動資金需求,現時負債比率達0.55,我想未來可能會有集資的需要。現價為 p/b0.55,我想配股的效果並不理想,借貨又可能因信貸質數不佳而難有優惠的條件。如果股價上升,將對卡森的發展十分有利。近一個月,卡森己回購 24m股。

究竟市場會怎樣評價業務增長,但現金流疲弱的公司呢?盈利增長,現 金流疲弱的理文造紙($12.6)己一飛沖天,市盈率達20倍,並頻獲貸款。卡森沒有遇上順勢的原材料行情,同為業務增長,下場卻有天淵之別,未來的路應 如何地走呢?

中國經濟增長的樽頸在於上游,而過渡投資使下游工業泛濫,低水平重 複建設普遍。價值都向上游轉移了,理文與卡森是一個典型的對照,讓我們反思投資中國的危與機。十一.五重點發展消費及鼓勵下游工業創新,價值能否重返下 游,現在下定論還言之尚早!現在以天價投資中國上游工業及以地價投資下游工業同樣面對很大的不確定性,投資者的確要小心。

Thanks to Carsen, I got Samson.

The responses from the others are similiar. It makes the idea even more interesting.

The Death of Writing Freedom:


It is surprising that some people have regarded some my analytical articles on Solomon Systech as buy-recommendations and come to blame me after their loss in keeping the stock. Even more suprisingly,  my counter-arguement of my previous analysis on the the ground of more updated infomation on fast-changing industry dynamics is ignored at the same time.

Investment decision is a self-made decision of which responsibility should be beared by oneself. I don't give recommendation on investment decision. If any definite implication can be drawn from my articles, there always exist misinterpretation.

Pressure from this kind of blaming readily hurt my confidence to write analytical articles on business even in my private diary. I hope long term readers of my homepage can be supportive despite my unwillingness to write freely.

(重貼xanga)Tuesday, July 11, 2006

   

2878 may have negative earning surprise because of the negative operational leverage


(重貼2005年11月)十字路上的晶門:

中小尺寸面板業已經在05下半年正式進入TFT的換代潮。 05Q3,台灣的TFT出貨量QoQ增長達100%。作為最大的小面板生產商的勝華,第四季也正式投產自制的TFT面板。隨著韓、台的大面廠將五代以下廠 轉為小面板的產能,TFT的價格已在05年頭開始下跌。本來由日本商廠獨佔的中小尺寸TFT面板市場的局面,將會在05年下半年產生劇變。

對晶門而言,TFT換代可提高TFT IC的銷量。然而,TFT IC行業跟CSTN不完全相同。台灣最大的小尺寸TFT面板廠為友達、奇美電及統寶,而CSTN則為勝華。TFT產業的公司跟晶門的關係是遠不及CSTN 產業。友達與奇美電都有自己的直屬IC設計廠。即使手機品牌可以決定IC,但有部份的IC使用權還是在面板廠手中。即是說,晶門有機會會失去在CSTN產 業中的關係優勢。

CSTN在03開始放量,04年倍增,04年平均也在$2美元。今 年,TFT才剛放量,IC價格價格已跌破$2。TFT的產業競爭是比CSTN還大的,而這將引致TFT IC產業的價格下跌幅度比以前CSTN產品週期為大。

晶門將要面對的TFT換代潮,好處是晶門有機會在TFT產業中延續 顯示技術的優勢,繼續佔領市場重大的份額,但同時將要面對改變了的市場關係及更大幅度的價格下跌。晶門的市場份額上升,出貨量上升將抵消價格下跌對銷售額 的影響。即使毛利可以由成本下跌來維持,但究竟下一步,晶門怎樣維持其在小尺寸面板的規模呢?OLED面板能為成為繼TFT之後的手機面板主流還是個疑 問,但OLED面板IC價格已跌至$2.5水平。兩年後的OLED價格,究竟會跌至什麼的地步呢?

三星表示會如大面板市場一樣,06年在中小尺寸面板中稱霸。相信中 小尺寸面板將會面對更大的壓力。然而,中小尺寸隨著這改變,有機會由日本導向,轉為完全非日本導向。如是者,非日本市場便會倍增。即使小尺寸面板價格急 跌,晶門在小尺寸面板的潛力還是很大,市佔率不斷提升是可以預測的。然而,整體中小尺寸產值下跌或維持,就現在看來是難以逆轉的。我甚至相信。05及06 年可能已是中小尺寸面板產值的高峰期。

晶門05年下半年將踏足大尺寸面板市場。顯然這是晶門的唯一增長出 路。相信中國的位置及與廣達的關係將可容易地帶領晶門進入大面板市場。然而,大面板競爭激烈,技術低,毛利低,而晶門的關係在大廠中不佔優勢。究竟晶門在 能否同樣地獲得如小面板的進展呢?

雖然晶門在這段時間將要面對很大的不明朗因素,但在這之後,增長便 會變得明朗。隨著大面板上軌道,TFT換代成熟,07年開始進人OLED換代,mp3市場大規模化,新型顯示器技術開始成熟,將可為晶門帶來可觀的增長潛 力。然而,短期而言,那些因素是很難確認的。

手機品牌在05年開始生產超低價手機,主攻中國、巴西及印度,打機 二手機市場。這使舊有技術如MSTN及低階CSTN也維持出貨量。這因素一方面導致晶門的出貨量及市佔率急升,同時也使舊技術的出貨量不因換代而下跌。另 一因素是Nokia的面板訂單有機會隨著日本TFT失勢而釋出。該訂單對非日本廠的影響力巨大,暫時難以估計其影響的程度及時間表。這些,都將會05年下 半年可以得知。

我大半年前已表示,05下半年是晶門最不明朗的時間,前景能見度極 低。現在,究竟可以如何定價這公司呢?我真想知道。

(重貼2005年十月)賣掉晶門:
上星期,我賣掉所有晶門,大手吸納零售與酒店股。

賣掉晶門真是一件不容易的事,始終公司是我喜歡的模型,自己放了那 麼多時間去研究,抱了半年多,也讓我賺進不少,而且股價還在上升中,在這階段賣掉,真是有點壓力。可是,抱著晶門的這段期間,不少工業、零售與酒店股也下 跌了很多,也有不少做得不錯的。至於晶門,下半年其實我並不看好,我相信這次將會出現第一次沒有earning surprise的業績,而過渡憧憬業績的人更會對業績感到失望。這其實也是因為晶門的產品與行業特性呢~

Investing chatting with a friend:


I am also interested in BSX, MDT's competitor. MDT+BSX now accounts for >80% of the product market share. The indsutry has huge barrier of entry and a 1x-2x% annual growth. Even in the US, the product is still young and have very good prospect. But MDT is still trading at 3xpe and BSX at 1xpe, not VERY attractive. In this kind of industry, I prefer buying the best and the cheapest(now, MDT+BSX)

Solomon Systech has announced interim result toda. Profit and dividend both drop 50%, lining on the bottom of my -40-50% expectation. I think this result will disappoint the market a lot(ibanks expect 3x% drop+stable dividend). That's why I sold all the stocks at $2.2 before after the ~$2 purchase, appearing like a short-term-price-driven speculation. However, in the mid-term, the company has a not-so-bad-prospect(a long story,let me tell you next time). With huge uncertainty(fear) spreading over the market, a very attractive price may appear in the future.

I.T keeps rising after unloading. It doesn't bother me because its development in the China is very uncertain compared with other ideas. Also the valuation is high compared with Moiselle(130) and Bauhaus(483). I am interested in Bauhaus also. But it has a short listing history and high volatility in wholesales business. So I prefer staying in Moiselle at this moment.

The fundamental of Regal Hotel hasn't improved thought the price keep rebounding. Hotel business is a cyclical industry, subjecting to global economy and domestic supply. As Regal Hotel's brand value is not high and business is concentrated in Hong Kong, the risk of the business is higher than global hotel groups. I am interested in this stocks because I believe it can transform to a hotel management by raising the hotel REIT, but it is postponed because of the bad sentiment. The general price performance of REIT is bad in HK. Investor has less interests in REIT now. I believe the best timing of raising the REIT in short term has passed. The prospect of Regal Group become less attractive. The risk of hotel business is intact. This accounts for our unloading. Luckily, the trade is profitable in this mistake.

I am also studying PICO(752) and GOME(493). These businesses are attractive because of their negative working capital. Pico is doing quite well in exhibition industry. With a stable(or less risky) exhibition construction business, pico is extending to the exhibition management business by making use of its network and credibility in the exhibition industry. However, because the fixed cost(rental of exhibition, admin) is high, the business has very high operational leverage and therefore, the profit will rise drastically when sales is up and vice versa. Trading at 13pe, given ~1x-20x% growth prospect, the margin of safety is not enough for me.

GOME is the largest electrical applicance company in China. It announced merger with the third largest player(503) recently, making the even larger and largest play in China. The industry will go into transition after this merger. The strategy of the new GOME is not known yet. Either it can stop its famous aggressive pricing to improve profitability or it can transfer all the synergy to customers in order to increase the economic moat. This company is interesting. Let me tell you more when we meet later. Currently, I am not interested in buying it yet. More infomation or margin of safety is needed.

I am also watching my favorite Techtronic, Esprit and Li&fung. Their business are so good that i can't tell you any better. But their valuation is not attractive compared with my OTHER ideas. But for Techtronic, it has record new low today. I told you that I was disappoined in this company because of the worse-than-my-understanding cashflow, however, if it is cheap enough, I believe this company is still interesting.

I also have numbers of cigarbutt ideas in my mind. But I don't wanna step into cigarbutt if I can't diversifed(e.g.10-20 stocks) the portfolio extensively because of lacking of ideas and capital. Also, time will my enemy in cigarbutt investing. When I have no idea and turning to be defensive, I may consider stepping into it.

筆克遠東:


Stock price: $1.45
Market Cap: $1.7B

Industry Nature: Cyclical, in phase with general economy
Business Origin: Singapore
Ownership: Family Tse
Business and listing history: >15 years
Business nature :Auction, price competition +Total Solution, Network
business.
Production method: Pull-style
Working capital for growth: close to 0
Business transfomation: Exhibition contrustion(low value-adding) ->
Exhibition Management(still small now, high value adding)
Freecashflow Yield: ~10%(2005)
Capex requirement nature: Low
Operating Profit/ Gross Profit: 27.2%(2005)
Management remureration/net profit: 15%(2005)
Net Cash: 297m

Short term outlook:
1 Good because of good econ
Long term:
1 Currently in the uptrend of cycle. Potential downside is not small.
2 Exhibition management skill is uncertain. Record is short and not really
good
3 Exhibition management development secures stabler sales.

Risk:
1Inflated econ now. Operational leverage effect is larged reflected.
2Lumpy sales with leveraged fixed cost for further growth, which could
sqeeze margin by negative operational leverage occassionally
3Receviable risk
4Terriorism and Avian Flu may cold down exhibition industry.

Placement:
2006/10/5 $2.025, 42m

國美研究(一):


Wednesday, July 26, 2006
   
BestBuy買五星, 四大謀合
永樂買大中, 國美買永樂
優惠稅率維持
北京國美未注入
鵬潤攻BestBuy高檔市場
不儲存貨, 風險低, 利率低
永樂不夠錢買大中, 要資本運作, 被大摩報告及沽盤阻止
銷售人多來自品牌, Eagle店國美人
國美以品牌分類, Eagle以產品分類

永樂可否取得90%股東贊成?
1 好多股東係蟹, 失敗左唔係好事
2 永樂競爭力唔係好夠, 長遠
3 依家係換股, 所以買倒變強了的國美都唔錯有著數
4 大摩唔滿意永樂, 唱衰佢+減持, 等佢股價唔好, 買唔倒大中
5 Bestbuy可能好強, 整合對付外資好d
6 永樂上半年業績倒退

2006年7月


嘉利國際:


今日見完佢地,加上之前對嘉利的認識,終於得出結論。

嘉利擁有塑膠五金業及EMS部門。科網爆破後,塑膠五金業收入大 降,管理層思考發展方針,決定進軍EMS部門。現在塑膠五金業反彈,跟客戶的關係加強,使EMS增長強勁,同時帶給塑膠五金業一點生意。

塑膠五金業本身跟隨著下遊產品之周期而波動,近年正是處於上升周 期,所以發展良好。然而,可以想像當產品周期走下波時,這業務將會受影響。EMS部門經營溢利52m,Tie-in給塑膠五金業的經營溢利大概有11m, 總共63m。然而,這還未計財務成本及稅項。最後,這個EMS部門還要投入45m的資本開支及營運資金,還有不能量化的管理資源。計算一下,這個部門在業 務好景時也獲利甚微,而且人力成本上升及存貨風險存在,業務走下波時收縮難度高,究竟想怎樣呢?

嘉利國際ROE30%,現價$2.95,派息5.8厘(扣除特別股 息),市盈率6.5倍。這數據似層相識,就像當年的毅力工業一樣!

嘉利國際規模只及台灣數目不少的EMS廠大,最大的 Flextronics, Solectron也不太賺錢。塑料五金入行容易,EMS獲利極微,風險不少。資本開支大,應付周期彈性不高。兩個行業都不能加價,只能接受被減價,存貨 風險不能對沖。做得好才能夠生存,做得不好就死...人誰無過呢?這很困難的行業啊!

優化流程可以殺出血路嗎?如果可以持續大幅度改善,的確可以。問題 是生產流程不是很複雜,而且被顧客的設計限設了,不像豐田汔車擁有二萬多件零件及無數流程,可以不停優化。另外,競爭對手都在做同樣的優化。

有趣的是這個行業非常困難,愛高競爭可以做到那麼高的純利率,看來 周期性在電子行業十分重要。

嘉利國際被人稱為好公司,但或許是我對好公司的看法不同,我開始質 疑嘉利國際的質素。嘉利國際說他們發展EMS業務,主要是因為想發展。為發展而發展可能對管理層來說是好的,因為更大的生意額可使他們有更大的權力及酬 金,但對投資者而言,我會重視股東回報率。嘉利國際的EMS業務如之前形容,獲利少風險高回報低,其業務的股東回報率會否高於無風險利率呢?嘉利國際在科 網熱潮爆破後,塑料五金業務陷入低潮,定價低廉,如果管理層加強其本業,或進行回購,會否比進入EMS業務好呢?

當我問及管理層,為何要發展EMS業務,得知到管理層有強大的增長 壓力。不知會否是有些機構投資者不停游說後的結果,但我認為管理層不應為滿足個別股東的要求而改變為股東增取長遠利益的大前提。增長並不等於增加股東的長 遠利益。管理層回避要進行長期投資的業務,害怕使投資者失去興趣而紛紛拋售股票,結果進入了較容易但回報及潛力低的EMS業務。這裏出現了一個語言上的漏 洞,在投資者”拋售”股票的同時,也會有另一些投資者”吸納”股票,那股票才會成交。在低價吸納股票的投資者,就是嘉利國際需要的投資者,就是那些可以承 受前期投資的股東。進行長線的前期投資而為股東帶來長遠的股東利益,最終必可使股東獲得合理的回報。經營者沒有必要確保股價每年增長。

嘉利國際,真是可惜!如果管理層經營的是I.T,那就好了~

What are the factors affecting stock price?


You are right, there isn't an exact answer at all. But each of us actually
have an answer inside your mind which is in fact the core of investing
philosophy of ourselves. At the same time, as if ourselves, it is ever
evolving, by our experience and knowledge. I would also like to share my
view here~just for sharing~

Although I claim myself to be an value investor, I am always challenging my
own belief. Yes, I am not trusting it wholeheartly. For example, I believe
Mr. Market is actually a self-fulfilling idea: If the market move as we want
to(we call it value reflection), we say Mr.Market is rational/right. If the
market doesn't move the way we want, we say Mr. Market is irrational/crazy.
How can we be wrong then?

Now, I always believe the Mr.Market isn't really as irrational as me. I am
quite likely to be less intelligent than Mr.Market because of my relative
weaker info-power. However, I believe Mr.Market is a sensitive person. He is
irrational sometimes only, not always. It reflect both the short-term and
long term fundamentals though they can be contradicting. But how much is the
price affected by short-term and long-term? That's the first factor I
concern.

There is always uncertainty(risk) in the market and in our life. The degree
of risk tolerance and aversion of us change over time. We can describe the
degree by the word "Sentiment". This "Sentiment" also is the second factor
affecting the price.

And the end, that's the rationality, or more appropriately, the actual
performance of an company as if you are looking back from the future, that
affect the price. However, I dont believe it is an exact number. Because of
the uncertainty, we can never know what will happen exactly in the future.
We can only estimate the probable range of value of an certain company. And
the range change over time upon change in degree of uncertainty. Of course,
the fundamentals are a lot of things and that's what I think I am working on
so far.

Now, I can only think of that three factors(and of course there are a lot of
factors behind the 3). Perhaps there are more coming up to my mind in the
future. Anyway, from my understanding, value investing is something like
buying something good in long term and bad in short. To reflect the long
term, time is needed, so we need patience. And because the more time ahead,
the uncertainty is larger, so there are uncertainty and that's we need to
discount that risk. And I believe value investor call it "margin of safety".
The margin of safety is different in different investment even when the
uncertainty is the same. Think about one company having 20% growth and
another one having 0% in the long run.

2006年6月

Proposal of share buyback of Solomon Systech: (12/6/2006)


Dear Humphrey,

I am the CUHK student studying Chinese Medicine. As a shareholder of
Solomon Systech, I write to propose share buyback of our company
because of the reasons written below:

1 Solomon Systech needs to utilize our large cash reserves.
Solomon Systech has more than HKD$1B net cash while the capex
requirement of Solomon Systech is low. Our operation cashflow is far
enough to support our capex given we are to stay in our core business.
The opportunity cost of keeping too much cash is high.

2 Solomon Systech is an outstanding investment canadate itself.
We can increase our shareholder value by investing in high return area
related to our core business. While thinking of how to expand our
business and invest in high return area, we are actually running a
high return busniess. The ROE excluding the cash is almost 100%. And
Solomon Systech is our core business and it is the area that our
management and shareholder are the most familiar with. The return-risk
ratio is relatively low

3 Share buyback benefits employees of Solomon Systech
Our employees are partly motivated by the option incentive schemes.
Personally, I believe aligning the value of business with employees is
a wise chocie in IC design industry which require high creativity,
loytaly, integrity and team-work. Share buyback means that our
management is confident in our business, giving our employees a sense
of safety and a sense of belonging.

4 Share buyback lower the risk of Solomon Systech in the financial community
Also, the uncertainty of our business and industry are relatively
high. Credit relationship is built on trust. Recently, the share price
of Solomon Systech has dropped over 50% from the top in three months.
I believe this somehow will adversely affect our impression in the financial
industry. With a high volatility of share price, the risk of
investment is high and our business will have a deeper discount in the
future. Share buyback shows that our management is confident in our
business.

5 The timing and opportunity of share buyback is good.
Solomon Systech is a high return business in a cyclical industry. We
are cyclically affect by ASP erosion, tightening capacity in foundry
and packaging, competition, technology shift, disappointment in end
products and inventory volatility along the supply chain. I believe it
is a good time to initiate share-buyback when the financial community
is paying more attention to all those adverse factors than our
opportunites and competitive advantages. Currently, the financial
community is pessimistic about the future of Solomon Systech,
projecting a dim future of our development along the cycle. I believe
it is a rare and good opportunity to initiate share buy-back

Humphrey, I confidently believe that you and other managers of Solomon
Systech are outstanding and talented enterprenears in this age. China
and Hong Kong's capital market are in need of good examples of
financial operation. I am sure Solomon Systech is demostrating well. I
believe you and all the staff of Solomon Systech will do the right
thing at the right time in this turbulent time. Hope you all the best!

Regards,

Franky


資訊複雜及業務複雜:


今日Peter, kit, doctor chan食飯,成晚都講晶門,結果佢地都覺得好複雜,感覺麻麻,所以佢地都想知晶門長期最少可維持的盈利有多少。老實說,我不知道呢!

或許研究晶門給人的感覺是,很複雜,行業變化很快,很難預測,難以 定價,風險高。然而,回顧過去多個投資經驗,晶門始終是我最有把握,最清晰的!我可以隨時談論晶門及其供應鏈中間商的關係及其變化,他們的歷史及重心,從 以推測及解釋行業的變化及晶門的處境。我十分喜歡這種清楚及資料豐富的感覺,使人有一種安全感。至於定價,那是一個回報及風險的選擇呢,並不是一個真理!

晶門為何如此複雜,其實主要原因不是因為其業務複雜,而是因為晶門 的行業透明度高,資訊太多。晶門的定位十分清楚,是獨立的顯示器技術晶片設計商,財務的簡潔更是一絶。幸運地,我們可以清楚了解晶門的供應鏈,知道誰是供 應商,誰是顧客,誰是顧客的顧客等,各環節之間的競爭情況,還有每日update的行業新聞!除了投資美聯及港交所,我想不到有其他公司可讓投資者更貼近 經營的實況。

投資思捷、中石油、偉易達等公司,我們可以知道的,就只限於那間公 司,很難可以作出供應鏈全環節的分析,或者這需要超強的資訊力,所以我們只有看一些大的趨勢,依賴過去表現去評估公司,之後再推測佢地未來既表現。因此, 很多時會有一些突發性的事,例如成本上升及消費下降等難以預測及調查,只能靠信或用多渠道去驗證,分析起來其實也很複雜,很難估的。

如果說一間公司最sustainable的是什麼?我會答,” 人”。這也可以說是管理,系統及文化吧!因此,我不太擔心產品周期完會使一間好的公司衰落,除非該產品就是那公司的全部。當然,前提是公司要”好”,而怎 樣才算好,大家可以多看書或研究勁公司。

到現在,我越來越懷疑定價的用處。不能否認,定價可作為參考,但定 價真的是很有限制的,就如同估short-term result去trade一樣。最大的問題是,未來是不確定的,而市場也不是完全無知的。有時,有些公司會很便宜,但它們便宜是有原因的,現在看似便宜, 數年後則不太便宜了,因為公司正面對著更大的問題及擁有更少的現金。

剛才講的是定價的Downside,現在談它的 opportunity loss。一百年前,如何把可口可樂定價呢?誰會給它現在的定價呢?以前根本不可能會如此預測,但它的確做倒了。

利豐及Medtronic 30倍PE,是否很貴?那就見仁見智!個人認為,頗便宜呢~VTech及富士康,實在太貴了!

2006年5月


I.T Analyst Meeting:


1Generally, the result is in-line with forecast.
2Gross margin declines due to a shift of product mix to international brand and a larger wholesales business.
3JV's profit is over-stated due to new accounting policy. The actual profit should be $-4m.
4Rental cost increase is buffered by cost reduction in operating overhead and fixed cost leverage.
5Staff cost to revenue remains stable and tend to increase
6Saks Fifth Avenue is a big project ahead
7Acquired  the sole-distributing licence of Kenzo in China from LVMH, costing 30m which is capitalized.
8There are about 20 analysts attending the meeting
9Mr. Shum remains silient throughout the meeting

...

My comment:
The result is in line with the reported earning larger than my expection. But by reducing the 8m profit in JV accured from fair valuaton accounting, the result is exactly in line with 0% growth in net profit.

In 2006, the general retailing industry of Hong Kong is positive because of increasing income, optisitic setiment of Hong Kong economy and wealth effect. Statistics shows that interests hike does not affect the retailing industry much.

I.T will still be the leader of the fashion industry in Hong Kong because of no outstanding competitors and a high capital requirement for competitors and new entry to expand. The business will stable flat in 2006 with higher sales but lowered profit margin because of hiking rental and staff cost.

The business of I.T has not dilulted by expansion, implying that the market of the brand portfolio of I.T is not saturated yet. Expansion will result in large sales and profit.

Inventory and capex is larger than expected. Cashflow is worened by the capilization of royalty fee. The cashflow management of I.T should be closely followed. Currently, a non-negative free cashflow can be tolerated because of aggressive expansion in China and one-time capex in royalty fee.

One point should be noted about I.T's profit is that the interests income has large impact on the earning. That's means the the real profitability of the retail business is actually smaller than the reported one. Therefore, the sensitivity of leverage is actually buffered in 2006. The situation is likely to continue on 2007. Any expansion plan utilizing the large cash reserve will lower the interet income and bring the sensititivity back to normal. The risk of the business of I.T remains high.


見指忘月:


1A stream of profitable new products from an adequately funded research organization
2An effective sale organization
3Good profit margins that are consistently improving
4A people-oriented company with management depth
5A company with solid financial controls
6A business that has growth potential but doesn't require major capital expenditures
7A shareholder-freindly management group with great integrity

2006年4月


可留意的公司:


馬鋼: 巨大的收購價值
建行:宏調拉闊息差
交行:宏調拉閣息差,改善中的營運
晶門:低檔手機出檔強勁帶動,產品周期延長
I.T:潛在的卓越品牌經營者(潛在only)
慕詩:被遺忘的內需股
俊和:巨大的資產拆讓
富豪酒店:轉型的轉捩點
新灃:隱藏的內需股,異常的投資及營運效率
飛達:轉型的冒險
利信達:轉型的冒險

中國金融業展望:


1宏調拉闊息差
之前比較過內地銀行及香港銀行的息差,發現前者明顯地高於後者。今 次宏觀調控調高貸款息率但維持存款率,目的是為了冷卻過熱的投資及觸發內需。這意味著如果中國經濟維持高增長,在十一五期間,內地的息差將會維持在較高水 平,甚至更加拉闊。內地銀行在未來數年將會十分有利。

2金融業投資多元化,增加回報及風險
另外,先期龐大的撥備及QDII隨著時間慢慢成熟,也有助內地銀行 及其他金融機構提高回報。雖然內地金融股已有一定升幅,但我認為內地金融股可能有比想像中更大的價值。(當然,可留意 not = 可投資,)

要小心的是內地銀行或金融機構控制風險的能力,例如貸款風險管理及 外匯投資風險管理及內部道德監控。

3購併熱潮拉動投資銀行業務
中國現時多個上游產業出現產能過剩,當中不少的企業都是上市公司, 價格因惡性競爭而十分低廉,有的甚至不及產能投資成本的四分之一,內在十分大的購併價值。加上該等行業集中度低,在國際市場的議價能力低,使中國大部分承 擔著全球商品價格上漲的壓力,維持下去對中國的成長具十分大的威協。我預期未來購併將會加快發生,而投資銀行的需求將會爆炸性增長。

4期貨市場發展滯後
中國現時的期貨市場十分不成熟,只有十多種產品,跟國外脫節,這使 國內貿易風險難以貼近國際市場。然而,發展期貨市場又會下游行業企業之自身議價能力下降,這使期貨市場停滯不前。

投資市場將要調整:Wednesday, April 19, 2006


911後,歐洲、日本及美國放鬆銀根,全球資本流動增加,使近年的 債市、股市、樓市及商品市場全面上升。上月,日本央行決定取消自99的”Quantitative Easing",加上日本經濟強力反彈,通脹上升,使日本將進入加息周期。到時,歐洲、日本及美國同時收罕緊銀根,是廿多年罕見的。

資金增長大於投資增長將拉低投資收益率,迫使保險資金流向較高風險 的高收益率投資,例如由債市流向股市及商品市場及由成熟市場流向新興市場。

近日,在格老發表警告全球資產泡沫的言論後,股市、金市及油價均創 新高,表現與資金收緊政策背離。究竟原因何在呢?

如果是預期全球銀根收緊力度放鬆,這是難以想像的。中國在2005 年已由通縮輸出變成通脹輸出,日本復甦,全球資產急升,美國失業率及存款率創新低,樓市高位運行...各種因素都傾向於收緊銀根。

如果是預期QDII出場及人民幣逐步開放,使全球新增一個資金來 源,所以現在要預先收窄境內外的收益率相差,也是難以想像的。中國保險規模小,而且投資集中在債券,對全球資產市場支持有限。另外,中國一直已在全球債市 有重大的參與QDII只是將債券投資的職能從銀行分散到其他投資者。要中國國民參與境外投資的的轉變需時,所以短期對境外市場的影響也是有限的。

經過多年的升幅,市場對投資的風險敏感度已下降,而且受經濟轉好及 財富效應的影響,對投資的需求上升,推高價格,現在已進入過熱的狀態。市場及經濟將慢慢感到銀根收緊及通脹的影響。為了市場及經濟的健康發展,投資價格將 要調整到合理水平。

2006年3月

How to evlauate 2878:


大市終於調整,指曾經跌過120點,但低位承接力強,卒上番高位收 市,僅跌31 點;國指跌幅較大,收6506,跌74點。調整市勢料會維持多兩三日,可候低吸納,迎接下一個升浪。科技股表現大強勢,好似晨訊科技(2000)、晶門科 技(2878)同早日推介的奕達(2662),都能逆市而升,基金同大行收集科技股已有好一段時日,相信科技股今年內會現急升。奕達推介時股價3.2元, 噚日最高3.625元,兩日上升13%,同今年低位2.1元比較,升幅72%。晶門收3.65元,今年大部份時間在3.5元至4.0元間上落,在科技股紛 紛起動之際,晶門有追落後概念。晶門係晶片設計商,產品主要用於電子產品的顯示屏,過去幾年業績有驕人增長,由於愈來愈多電子產品使用顯示屏,晶門的高增 長仍可持續。晶門的優勢係將生產全部外判,本身則專注產品設計、品
質監控同銷售推廣,集中資源研發更高利潤的產品,例如MP3顯示屏 應用的OLED晶片,晶門便佔全球產量的50%。


野村力薦睇5.04元
05 年度(12月結)的上半年,晶門的晶片付運量達1.08億件,升66%;其中主要供手機用的彩色STN達6140萬件,升113%;而OLED達1600 萬件,升98%。由於OLED的需求持續上升,對晶門非常有利,業界估計今年OLED的出貨量會倍增,晶門管理層有信心,公司的增長可與市場同步,甚至超 過。另外,晶門亦已加速發展大屏幕TFT顯示器晶片,去年佔營業額比重約1%至2%,預計今年可上升到5%至10%。野村證券係晶門的大好友,研究報告調 升其06年及07年的盈利至9130萬美元及1.05億美元,按年增長約31%及15%,每股盈利分別係3.6美仙及4.2美仙。野村給予晶門「強烈買 入」投資評級,目標價為5.04元。晶門股價已重上10日線,若升破20日線(3.67元),新升浪可確認,初步目標係前高位3.975元,整固後再上, 可見4.7元。

How about if I write like this:

晶門科技過去半年累積升幅五成,但管理層並不能實現較早前預期大顯 示器TFT IC出貨佔營業額10%,加上聯詠及奇景在全球大型顯示器市場中地位不斷提升,並分別與台灣大廠友達及奇美電子有策略同盟關係,晶門科技未來或未能達至經 濟規模與台灣廠商競爭。另外,香港缺乏人才及政府稅務優惠,使晶門科技要用高薪吸引人才及繳交高昂的稅項,大大拖累晶門科技的競爭力及盈利能力。筆者擔心 晶門科技在未來將擁有較低毛利及較多樣化之產品組品之時,能否與台灣及韓國之廠商競爭。另外,晶門科技之各產品組近四季均出現5-10%之跌幅,年跌幅達 30-40%。同時,如中芯及台積電等中台晶圓代工廠商均表示利用率上升,晶圓代工價格止跌回升。在此消彼長的情況下,晶門科技之毛利在未來將會下跌壓 力。另外,高度垂直整合之三星電子較早前宣佈,將在2006年大幅增加小型TFT顯示器面板之市場佔有率,具體實拖方法未來,並不排除以過往大型TFT顯 示器市場駛用的大幅度降價策略。這將大幅打擊小型TFT顯示器生產商之利潤率及市場佔有率。作為主要供應商之一的晶門科技,未來或要承受小型TFT顯示器 廠商部份壓力,而同時三星電子擁有自己的IC設計部門,所以低價放量的市場增長或未可惠及晶門科技。至於OLED方面,晶門科技現今擁有大於50%的市場 佔有率,而市場正快速增長。然而,高度垂直整合之日韓廠商,正大幅加大OLED顯示器生廠技術及生產線之開支,而它們同時擁有高技術的IC設計部門,使 OLED面板之IC設計市場存在巨大的風險。可是,在OLED市場增長之前,OLED面板之單價在2005年跌幅大於五成,而未來廠商數目及供應量將會增 加,價格將進一步下跌。最令人擔心的是,市場正流正單晶片技術,即一顆晶片提供所有功能的運作能力,如Sigmatel供應給蘋果電腦ipod shuffle之IC就是其中之一,這可大幅削減成本及節省體積。如果未來單晶片技術繼續成熟及普及,不排除單晶片會將包含顯示器IC功能,這將嚴重打擊 中低檔次之顯示器驅動IC市場。

how to evaluate 2878 then?it's up to you!

晶門2005業績預測:


1CSTN新產品未放量,使CSTN產品價格跌勢持續強勁
2TFT廠供應大,價格跌勢強勁,晶門在TFT廠商沒有在CSTN 時那樣好,對手也較強

晶門的大客正在青黃不接的時期,晶門上半年TFT放量使我失望, TFT價格跌幅卻超出預期。對比上年同期ASP及出貨量強勁...我認為05H2相對上年難有高增長,如果有20%已算是不錯。全年有40%晶圓代工取消 拆扣,面對產品價格下跌,毛利有點壓力,或許operational leverage可抵消。

ASP
上半年:2004: 1.69 ; 2005: 1.71
出貨量增長66%,所以sales也增長69%,相若
下半年:2004: 2.15 ; 2005: 1.46(expected by me, decline 7.5%QoQ)

樂觀地,即使出貨量維持66%增長,下半年sales只可有 12.7%增長。
假設純利率相若,全年增長31.2%。

然而,我懷疑下半年能否達到66%的出貨量增長,因為04上半年, 顯示屏出貨量是增長初期,下半年已經是高增長期,05上半年相對上半年高增長較容易,個base較細,下半年要高增長,單是在手機顯示屏是難以達到的,所 以要期望OLED及大TFT driver IC支持,但他們分別的單價及毛利都較低。

OLED, 大TFT銷售並不什麼透明,也難跟同業比較,所以我不敢評論。但以主力CSTN產品而言,其最大客戶勝華TFT及新CSTN出貨較慢,在Jan- FEB2006出現30%左右的銷售額跌幅,我認為是單價下跌及新舊產品替換問題造成的。我相信晶門會面對類似的問題,只是晶門產品較分散,影響未必咁大 吧了。這究竟會否反映在今期業績,我還不敢說,但我會因此而懷疑我66%出貨量,甚至7.5%的ASP下跌。

結論:
1變數大,不利居多,難有驚喜。
2新產品:Slow pace of fast change
3顯示器技術,已漸漸不是市場的焦點了...
------
事後檢討:
1Profit 32% increase
2ASP下降抵消出貨量增長
3毛利下降
4operational leverage抵消毛利下降 )

全中!

剩餘產能:


大野耐一一直主張要”減少浪費”...但很多時這四字被別人誤解 了,反而弄巧反拙。一部機器,有60%時間在運作,剩下40%產能。你或許認為那40%的產能浪費了,為了減少浪費,應該盡量運用那40%產能。結果,你 想到如果可以接外面的委外訂單,用埋那40%產能,便可以增加收入,物盡期用。

這其實是沒什麼大問題的,增加收入後,工廠的績效提升了,人人都受 到讚賞,市場或許也喜歡,股價會上升。當這部份收入可觀時,或許管理層會想:”或許我們可以把這業務分支,成為新的業務。

這個新部門增長迅速,要投入資金增產。本業也在增長,也要投入資金 增長。同時,業務增長,所以要派一些熟練的管理人才去管理及開拓業務,而把之次等的人才留在業務成熟的核心業務。人才也認為自己的能力應放在具挑戰性的項 目上。大家對未來都充滿希望,股東也一樣。

可惜,市場環境變差,低毛利的新業務接近虧損了,客戶的應收賑也增 加,公司資金鏈緊張,只好借貸或集資維持經營。核心業務的人不善經營,市場份額停滯不前,部份產品更進入週期老化階段。

公司最後會有不同的結局:
1果斷重組:
公司察覺問題在於人及資產都放在非核心業務上,導致效率低下,慢慢 失去競爭力。因此,公司賣掉代工業務,重視核心業務的創新及市場開拓,小心控制資本開支,審核代工伙伴,在產能不足時外委生,小心資本開支及營運資金的增 加。以現金流作為績效的考核標準,而非營業額及利潤。另外,重視過剩產能的原因,而非處理方案。”減少浪費”的手段是”改善”,”改善”之前便要清楚問題 的所在。改善要做的是處理問題而非回避問題。重組時出現龐大的撥備開支,輕化後的公司充滿活力,管理層在失敗後都變得更審慎及努力,想挽回市場、供應商及 客戶的信心。兩年後,重組終於開花結果,業務重上軌道,再上一層樓。

2怨天尤人
公司面對困境,面對客戶、供應商、銀行及投資者等各方面的壓力,管 理部門都忙於推卸責任,希望盡量減少被處分的機會。面對外力,公司也績極向各方打好關係,拆扣、數期及利率等都變得更優惠,而使公司的業績及財務看起來還 十分強勁,以滿足投資者需求。可是,現金壓力沉重,財務狀況開始變壞,公司便以各種鴻圖大計及強勁的會計數字,向資本市場集資,以維持公司運作正常。公司 多年作出很多樂觀的預測,在每次業績公司時,都令人失敗。然而,管理層總有內外各種原因去解釋,甚至有時不甚解釋,不了了之。資本市場很快便察覺公司的問 題,最後公司便長期而低定價地存在在資本市場之上,公司的業務平平,各人掙扎求存,公司內部競爭加劇。最後到某一時候,公司被一些衝擊打垮了,貪便宜的股 東最後心血本無歸,又多一批人向其他人說明價值投資的失敗。

遠見、重視know-why、穩守核心業務、善用資源及人才及明確 的奬勵制度,真是管理者必要重視的元素。考處獲益後,還要考慮這利益的成本及間接成本是什麼,未來的方向是什麼,會帶來什麼機會及問題。

一間公司
1閒置機器多,生產系統意識薄弱
2工廠管理差,工序不明確
3存貨混亂
4應收賬及風險管理制度散亂
5不注重本業,業務不停外延,無競爭優勢地進入放量市場
6主席離職,私營業務
7舊管理人離職,另起爐灶競爭
8多年增發股票,運用不善,危害股東利益

即使股價長期低迷,資產實質並出現巨大拆讓,又如何呢?

中國因素的樽頸:


1194衰11(在未成熟市場做期貨對沖)而失敗,或許不是1194的錯呢...期貨市場的不成熟真的會造成越來越多的類似事件~這次只是冰山一角!

大豆、鐵礦石、銅礦石、石油及天然氣等等大宗商品市場,無一幸免地被國際市場所操控,中國入貨沒有議價能力,出貨也沒有議價能力,無限量地賤賣國家資源, 承受著全球經濟成本,任由國際機構炒家在商品市場掠奪...真的十分可悲!

中 國在資本市場運作的力量下,使多個行業高速增長,直至現在上游出現樽頸,利潤受。下游及國際需求持續,相信橂項壓力會一直下移。我一直是懷疑中國經濟可持 續發展的。一旦樽頸導致中國不能再驅動全球經濟,過高的投資、貨幣、信貸及資產價格將會進入一個漫長的調整期,以消耗產能、調合市場及提高效率等。


天然氣銷售跟過去電力行業很相似,固定售價使資產運作效率下降,導 致上游供需出現缺口,慢慢壓縮中游利潤。能源改革將會以價格市場化去增加資源運用效率,甚至有效利用國外資源。能源改革將導致非食品之CPI上升。基礎支 出價格如水、電、煤、交通及天然氣價格調升,將打擊內需及工業運作成本,所以要小心處理。

2006年2月


完美公司:


百年行業,百年企業,全球化加速穩定增長,混沌型市場,全行最大卻 只佔3%,零固定資產,零資本開支,零債項,五年90%派息比率,ROE>35%,10年以上雙位數增長,強勁現金流,開拓品牌,邊際利潤每年提 升,購併能手,智識型及偏平化組識,延伸中的環球業務,全球技術領先。

2006年1月

2005投資回顧及來年展望:


2005年回報:64.1%

今年可觀的成績,使我的五年計劃提早了一年半完成。回顧這一年,有 一些地方是做得不錯的,但也有地方是值得檢討的。

做得好的是,今年運用的基本分析技巧比之前更廣更深,也比較成熟及 有信心。最具代表性是投資晶門科技。年中吸收了豐田的生產理念,日本7-11的零售理念,Interbrand的品牌理念,大大加強了商業運作的基礎智 識,是今年最大的成就,也為未來的回報尊下了基礎。我感到自己很幸運,可以短時間內被我遇上了那些世界級的商業智慧,我認為這真是上天給我05年的大禮 物!

做得不好的是,入貨及出貨價做得很不好,而且交易次數也多。前者的 幸運因素高,加上自己對市場行為不夠認識,後者則是因為在學習及試驗一些Trading的技巧所致。實驗多次,應該輸多過羸。交易次數雖多,但心理質素改 進了,還可接受。

2006年,我希望可以加深豐田、日本7-11及品牌的理念,同埋 想多了解大額操作的方法。很想閱讀<<Origin of Species>>, <<Poor Charli's Almanack>>,也想繼續研究<<孫子兵法>>, <<黃帝內經>>及<<易經>>。

回報方面,我希望可以維持20%以上的目標,希望為客戶帶來理想的 盈利。


投資理論回顧:
一股投資法:高度確定,高獲利,高心理質素的要求
-從微觀到宏觀的分析:見微知著,審察產業各公司的行為去作宏觀預 測
-觀看:對零售股尤其重要,大野耐一及鈴木敏文的思想大派用場
-閒談:有能力及做好準備,管理層會樂意跟你對話
2資產管理回顧:
-Individual Account的問題:利益同步問題,要先向客戶交代
-資產管理公司:Unit Trust容易,但成本及限制高。
-投資合伙公司:限制低,招AUM較難。我比較喜歡。
3股票操作回顧:
-愛高:Earning surprise的容易投資機會,只適宜同時有時機及價值下操作。操盤下以投機理論配合,效果更佳。
-晶門:深度研究的投資機會,顯示個人小額投資的優勢。行業分析及 集中投資的良好試驗。是2005的主要增長來源。
-葉氏化工:有價值而不配合時機,成交低,勿用。
4商業理論回顧:
-豐田生產模式:頂尖的營運哲學
-日本7-11:頂尖的零售哲學
-西南航空模式:Operation Leverage的典範
-時裝行業的獨得性:心理學在商業的完美體現
-品牌理論:高層次消費者需求
-大額買賣技巧:
5各項經濟回顧:
-煤電聯動:冇咁慘吧了
-顯示器半導體業:06年正式踏進開始失色的一年
-香港及內地零售業:市場龐大,香港品牌有機會快速成長
-製造業:B2B,資本限制,存貨高,不懂豐田生產系統的都只能平 庸,甚至滅亡。

2006年展望:
我今年希望繼續在心理、進化論、豐田生產系統、零售管理及投資理論 上進步,而且要密切留意大額操作的技術。希望今年AUM能夠衝破2m,也希望今年能為額戶賺取合理的回報。希望再讀Charles Munger的所有文章,深入研究Bershire Hathway。

投機理論的重要性:

今日完成重讀<<Reminiscence of Stock Operator>>,獲益良多。無論是投機者抑或是投資者,我都建議閱讀此書,因為這書談到的大額操作問題,的確對市場會有影響。

投機不等於技術分析,後者只是大額操作者的佈局結果。投機是有複雜 的理論的,而且跟投資一樣,需要良好的心理質素及素養,良好的記憶及智慧,而且要配合基本面。近日,我開始認通投資及投機的理論可以相容。簡單來說,這就 是大額價值投資的操作方法,我想是未來必要學習的課題。

回顧過去,雖然我是從基本面出發分析公司,找到好的公司,在擁有安 全邊際下買入並長期持有而獲利,合乎價值投資理論。然而,我買入的公司差不多都給我賣掉了,原因是我看見情況變壞,或許價值被反映,迫使我把資金轉到上升 空間較大的的股票上。我的獲利主要體現在價值實現上。然而,期待價值體現發生頻繁是沒有根據的,這就是說期待未來回報同樣可觀是沒有根據的。要做到有信心 維持高的回報,選股、時機及資產分配同樣重要。過往大多的時候看坐在有潛力但不動的股票上,看著潛力相似的股票不停上升。分析個股及資產分配的工作不同, 就造就了分析員及基金經理的分別。我認為我有必要學習提高資產分析的效率。

長期持有的股票,跟隨公司成長而成長是十分理想的投資方法。然而, 機會難逢。這幾年買入的股票,都不太屬於這方面。反而是價值被低估,而後期因預期中的好消息導致價值反影。

然而,以新確為例,平均買入及賣出價是$1.5及$2.45,但一 年後它會計有問題,經營環境改變,股價不斷下探,低致$1.6左右的水平。這就是說,如果當初股價不升,我持有股票,之後出現經營環境改變,我的投資回報 便很低了。我認為這次獲利是幸運的。可是,如果配合投機理論,這次買入是有根據及合理的。這就是說,如果運用投機的理論,這次買賣及獲利便不是幸運了。

Jesse Livermoore的操盤技術是經過時間去驗證的,我認為是有價值的,尤其在市場性有限的股票上的大額操作。大額操作在中小型股上舉足輕重,我認為需要 重視。

當然,價值的哲學及經營本質是選股的根據,投機理論則是操作上的技 巧,不能本末倒置,除非想用安全性來換出高回報吧!

晶門到達目標價:


晶門終於到達今年的目標價$3.8元!我很高興市場可以接受這價 格。可是,要證實這是正確的,還需要更高的股價及長一點的時間!我相信晶門將慢慢可以達到這!

在我心目中,晶門不是高增長公司,而是低增長的波動公司,所以我只 能給$3.8的定價。除非晶門可以證明給我看它在IC的技術行業領導力,否則我依然覺得是危險的。TFT跟CSTN是完全不同的戰場,大TFT更是完全未 知,即使可以獲利多高,我也想先觀望一下了。難得市場對晶門很有信心,在業績之前已經反影了晶門的成功!我想人們在預期比TFT成功更多的東西,這是我不 知道的,所以我不值得賺取這些回報。

如果計落我賣掉晶門後的回報,我想只可以達到晶門$3.6x的水 平,我被"doing nothing"打敗了。這是我願意的!因為很舒服~很有趣可以跟自己的愛股競賽!我很想知道年終誰會勝出!究竟是我,還是以前的我!

思捷與利豐價格預測(二):


思捷與利豐價格預測(一)時說
330, $55.45, it should rise
494, $17.7, it should drop

現在
330, $62.4, 維持
494, $15.4 it should rise
494見底了!

這是個不錯的遊戲,改opinion時再寫吧!

LCD Mania:


富士康、唯冠、晶門、精電、信利及冠捷等LCD相關公司,近來股價 都升了兩成至四成不等。這些公司都是手機LCD或LCD TV相關的公司。顯然,市場近來對LCD需求的預期提高了。然而,我的商業知識告訴我,在短時間內越多資金投入的一個行業,競爭將會越大,投資回報將越 低。2005年,新的LCD廠建立,LCD IC設計廠成立,產品割價速度加快,產品換代加快,這都是投入的結果。人們都佈好了局,準備迎接LCD TV及3G電話的換代潮的來臨,尤其是期待著06世界盃對消費電子的需求可以進一步加強。

這次預期的調升,是我意想不到的。我認為3G、 LCD換代潮及mp3等是必然的事,早在2004年時,行內已經早有預期,出貨量及投資力度也說明了上遊廠商的預期及下遊品牌市場領導者的意向。很難想像 這消費可以導致股價上升,尤其是這在05下半年早已成了鐵一般事實。然而,又是可以預期的是,這些換代潮需求並不會是永無止境的增長,現在投資大,預期 高,行業競爭性加大,產值的增長放緩。我可以想像到,當換代潮高峰過去,產值將因競爭性而下跌,到時市場便要經歷新一輪的整合了,這些時期是嚴峻的。因 此,我無論如何,都只認為LCD相關產業並不是一個高速長行業,這就如同60年代彩色電視換代潮一樣,是一個產品周期性主導的行業。這些行業的產業,是不 可能像銀行業、零售業及地產一樣,隨著世界而成長的。產品的功能越大,產品周期就越長。80年代個人電腦對社會而言是革命性的產品,所以有20年以上的產 品周期。手機改變了人們溝通的方式,現在還未完成產品周期。LCD TV及MP3相對而言,功能比較有限,相信產品周期會較短。這些行業的投資不宜過大,例如LCD TV,各國的LCD面板廠投資了千億資金建廠,究竟行業可以提供多少利潤,以供給各公司可以獲得合理的回報呢?究竟消費方會否願意付出巨額的金錢去提供這 些利潤呢?在未來產值壓縮的時候,行業的競爭力效果將會變大,具影響力的行業及其中重要的廠商將會吞拼對手及產業鏈各部份的利潤以維持自己的盈利。個人電 腦業已經提供了一個很好的例子,只有壟斷性廠商可以勝利,如果行業沒有壟斷性廠商,整個行業將會毀於一旦。這是我對LCD相關產業的預言。

我的零售經營哲學:


前言:
研究了豐田生產系統,日本7-11零售哲學及I.T,走遍香港各大 商場及購物區,留意了各品牌及品牌建立的方法,跟零售商及顧客多次傾談,我大概獲得了分析零售業經營的信心。以常達變。如果我們知道了最好的做法是怎樣, 便可以知道怎樣診斷不同的情況了。這是我在中醫學到的寶貴分析態度。現在我就談談我欣賞及以之為分析之根本的零售管理哲學。

1商鋪為本思維:
一個零售商,可以包括很多個商業功能,例如設計、生產、物流、裝潢 折舊及宣傳等等。我今次主要談的,將會是以商鋪經營為中心的。然而,我想強調這並不代表其他功能不重要;相反,如果想提高商鋪經營效率,其他商業功能必須 配合。這將是高階管理層之戰略重點,中層管理層之主要任務,前線店員的日常工作。

零售業的成本,可分為固定及非固定成本。前者主要為租金、薪金、行 政費及、宣傳及設計費用,後者則主要是物料。基於非固定成本多數佔零售商很大的成本比例,因為銷售額增長便可帶來顯著的經營槓杆。即是說,銷售額越大,利 潤率理論上將會提高。然而,實際往往不是這樣,因為之前是假設非固定成本是不變的。在經濟好轉及暢旺時,銷售額雖然上升,但租金及薪金都會上升。加開店鋪 往往拖累整體經營效率而使銷售額上升未必帶來利潤率上升。

租金這成本佔非固成本很大。租金的釐定在於該商鋪的需求。換句話 說,這是對該鋪經營效率的要求。經營效率差的商鋪會被租金迫走,讓經營效率高,在高租金下還有利可圖的零售商進註。因此,如果零售商經營效率鶴立雞群,租 金上升並不會構成威協;相反,因為有大量商鋪被租金迫遷而招租,這才是大舉拓展市場的好機會。

總而言之,商鋪經營效率越高,零售商的能力便越高了,也之所以成為 分析零售商的根本。

2顧客為本之思維:
市場就像一個生態系統,弱肉強食,用進廢退,適者生存。不能適應顧 客需求的零售商,不能久存。因此,緊則顧客需求,以「以客為本」作為經營方針的根據,是極度重要的。現在是一個消費者主導的市場,而非生產商主導的市場。 以往消費者擁有的物質缺少,資金缺少,都會傾向購買便宜及耐用的。然而,現在大多數人的基礎物質需求都被滿足了,他們需求的,並不是他們欠缺的,而是他們 想得到更好的。價格的影響力已大不如前,要更好的產品及消費經驗才能夠吸引現今要求越來越高的消費者。可惜,市場上不少零售商的思維並不能商業市場的改 變,新的適應者將要佔領舊零售商的市場佔有率,而舊有零售商只好在萎縮的市場上面對激烈的惡性競爭。不能適應新消費氣候的零售商,將無一幸免地接受被淘汰 的命運。租金便是商業生態系統的調節器之一了。

然而,不少廠商其實都明白消費者的重要性,但「以客為本」的精神卻 被人誤會了。人們把「為顧客著想」跟「在顧客的角度想」混淆了。他們沒有考慮顧客真正的需要,而是把自己認為的顧客需求加於消費者之上。當經營不順利時, 便怪責消費者不能明白自己,或者把責任推到某一內部部門或人物身上。顯然,這樣的公司是存在著重要的公司文化及經營思維僵化,同樣將會面對淘汰的命運。

舉一個例子,理論上同一件產品,顧客是喜歡付更少的金錢去獲得的。 然而,如果你「為顧客著想」,減價來吸引更多客人,究竟是否正確呢?有一些對公司支持及忠誠的顧客,付出原價來購買公司的產品,但不久便大減價,讓很多人 可以以更低的價錢擁有該產品,那麼對那忠誠的顧客而言,會是怎樣的感受呢?要「以客為本」,必先知道自己的客人是什麼人,而不是盡量吸引最多的客人。減價 使客源變廣,收入增加,但客源及價格的差異化,品牌形象不能得到統一,是很難建立出強勁的品牌的。最後,忠誠顧客慢慢流失,品牌便走入商品化的不歸路。消 費行為擁有巨大的慣性,好的政策未必能短期內增加價值,壞的政策未必會改變消費行為,但任何強勁的零售商都必須走向正確的方向,而非利用慣性來獲取短期利 益。可惜,真正有遠見及擁有執行遠見的商業,並不常見。因此,擁有過人的零售技巧的商業,是大有可為的,本港零售市場並跟成熟的日本市場還差很遠。

3零售的四大任務:
商品齋全,鮮度管理,清潔維護,親切服務,是鈴木敏文提出的便利店 的四大任務。他將日本7-11之成功歸功於貫徹執行以上四大任務。我認為他的理論可應用於其他零售業,因為鈴木敏文「在顧客角度想」的觀點,在不同的零售 業也是適用的。商鋪的經營效率是零售業的根本,而商鋪的效率如何維持,其實就是靠做好這四項。聽起來容易,但其實則不然。

以客為本,所以做任何事必先考慮顧客的需要。以時裝零售為例,顧客 逛街時很多時並沒有指定的購買對象,所以商鋪如何吸引顧客進店,引起顧客逛店及購買的興趣,便決定了時裝零售商的商鋪效率了。最直接吸引顧客進店,就是店 內有很多種類的時裝讓顧客挑選,配以音樂及華麗的裝潢,使進店購物成了顧客的消閒節目,增加再光顧的機會。另外,款色隨時間而多變,使顧客每次進店都有新 的發現。店內切忌存貨堆積如山,減低商鋪的觀感及破壞顧客的消費體驗。有不少時裝零售店,店內存有大量存貨,一排衣架上竟放上五件同樣的恤衫。為何不放上 五件不同款色的恤衫供顧客挑選呢?如果是因為公司的能力,例如物流或設計的問題,請不要以此為藉口,因為任何不能適應消費者需求的商業都不可因任何藉口而 幸免。公司只能自強不息,改善內部運作,以配合消費者的需求,才能在消費者主導市場裡立足。

商店齊備便可有更多的產品供顧客挑戰,顧客購買的機會便會提高,而 且顧客留在店裡的時間也會延長,挑選自己喜愛的款色也能成為顧客的消閒活動。可惜,很多商鋪面積太小,不能容納太多的存貨,所以只能放上小量的款色。因面 積而減少讓顧客挑選的產品,便是以生產商角度去思考問題了,這是永遠不能滿足消費者的。善用面積、加強補貨頻率、減少存貨、多季多款、產品循環顯示及產品 目錄等,都可以加強商店的齋備程度。零售商可有無限的改善方案,由下而上及由上而下地產生及執行去改善商鋪效率。改善的背後,需要一個完善的內部建議制 度,可量度的貢獻標準及鼓勵嘗試創新的企業文化。最後,還需一班開放的管理層及有執行力的中層主管。這其實並不容易。

零售商,甚至其他行業的商業,多數都會有跟隨行業慣例的傾向。這是 很多制度及人性的產物,暫不在這討論。這個傾向是導致效率平庸、商品化及行業利潤率下降的原因。只有不斷繼續改善的企業才可以不斷成長,所以欠缺這種文化 的公司必會在成長中面對越來越沉重的壓力。

商品齋全而變化多,是進貨的基礎任務。然而,消費者主導的市場,物 質豐富,所以物質其實只構成消費的其中一部份,在差異化上更重要的是消費的體驗。品牌的建立在於產品質素、宣傳及分銷能力。這可在產品上添加對顧客群有價 值的意義。如何實踐,暫且不談。品牌的性格及背表的意義直接影響消費者對產品的感受。除了產品本身要貫徹品牌的形象外,包裝、裝潢、音樂及銷售員的形象, 也對消費體驗影響深遠。另外,消費是一個人的活動,當中銷售員的表現對消費有決定性的影響。購物是一種選擇,選擇帶來內心的沖突,帶來心理學上的焦慮,而 選擇便可以解決沖突而使消費成為一種舒緩壓力的活動。銷售員可多留意這情況,在適當的時候給客觀的建議,幫助顧客完成消費的選擇過程。有些銷售員會擔當顧 客的形象顧問,這比單純執行買賣動作的銷售行為更高層次了。然而,訓練、文化及獎勵制度的編制,主宰著前線銷售員的士氣及能力,這是管理層的責任。很多 時,公司會把銷售的部份就交給店長去處理,而忽略整體的配合,其實是很危險的一件事呢!

4集客力:
很多人認為,商鋪的人流是取決於地理位置,這是外在的因素,並不能 控制,結果這些零售商把集客力這重大因素完全忽視了。最後利潤率下降時,這些店主或經理會認為是租金不合理、市場需求轉變及消費力下降等種種外在因素導致 他們經營失敗的。這在把問題外化的經營思維是注定失敗的。

世界上有一種行業有人認為是不道德的,而且誰也知道對消費者不利, 但卻長年賣得如火如荼。這行業叫賭場。賭場上永遠不可以冷清,冷清會引起理性,理性的消費者並不會給賭場多少盈利。其實,一般零售商一樣,只有人流暢旺的 商鋪才能有高的效率。零售商要想辦法吸引客人進店,也要想辦法挽留顧客在店內。不管逛店的人最終是否消費,人氣旺的商舖才能有高效率是不難理解的。這也是 地理位置優良商鋪的租金為何如此高昂的原因。

商鋪內如果一目了然,款色少,而且常不更換,店內人少,價錢及產品 並不特別吸引,是很難達成成交的。另一個問題是,店內人少,道理?闊,人進入店內有巨大的壓迫感,離開卻有很強的迫切感。顧客在店內留的時間越少,消費的 機會越少。店內的人越少,消費也越少。相反,如果店內人頭湧湧,必會吸引更多的客人,即使產品或價格並不十分吸引,也能達成令人滿意的銷售額。消費很多時 是猶豫間一念之差,我們很多時購物其實並非滿足物質的實際需要,而是一種消費的體驗,追求改變、形象及非物質價值的行為。這些因素並非理性,所以消費的決 定很多時並非出自真實需要及價錢的理性考慮而成交的。相反,感性及直覺卻主導了判斷。聚集人流,加強消費氣氛是是零售效率的關鍵。

集客力思維是異常重要的,但它在不同零售商的表現卻很不同。無論如 何,產品的配合是必然的,前面已經說過。貨品的更新速度,種類的數量,還有顧客店內路線圖及其中吸引顧客的措施等十分重要。在這方面,高階管理層必須授權 給前線及中層主管負上改善的責任,並建立一個公平及透明度高的獎勵制度,加強員工教育,鼓勵商業間互相學習及解決問題,同時鼓勵競爭。這些複雜、宏觀及矛 盾的工作是改善商鋪效率及提高集客力的基礎。高階管理層只能聆聽、分析及嘗試建議而找到最好的方法。經過長期建議及改善的商鋪除了擁有高水平的效率外,還 可以成為零售商內其他商鋪的學習對像。零售商將建立起自己獨有的零售智慧、公司文化甚至市場定位。這些競爭力是長遠的,而且是難以複制的。這是任何零售商 成功的必備素質。

邪惡的存貨:
有些零售商為了提高店舖的效率,以便保持店內有足夠的存貨面對突如 其來的需求。結果,往往集團內會出現生產過餘的現象。最後,存貨過多,只好割價促銷,甚至放棄存貨。即使一件產品的物料成本只佔銷售額20%,而賣出一件 的利潤率是10%,那每剩一件產品便抵消了兩件售出產品的利潤了,而且還未計租金、行政及運輸的成本。如果割價銷售,最後便會傷害品牌形像及忠誠消費群, 而步向商品化。最終減低利潤及競爭力。存貨多也使商鋪有效面積減少,服務速度下降,人手增加。存貨成本,其實是異常沉重及影響深遠的。

存貨的出現,其實是為了應付需求的波動的。因此,只要減少需求的波 動,存貨水平也能大幅下降。零售商很多時會把這個責任交給商鋪主管負責,希望在訂貨貨及商鋪互相補給的方法減低波動。然而,實際上,依靠商鋪去控制銷售的 效果,其實並不明顯的。另外,因缺貨而失去客人的損失雖不會出現在會計上,但那卻是實實在在的機會損失。另外,在小而旺的商鋪裡,貨倉面積有限,所以因存 貨過多而使商鋪的款色種類有限。這大大浪費了小商鋪的價值,可知道店的面積越小,租金面積比是越高的。

高效率的物流系統及拉式生產可以解決存貨的問題,從而大大提高商鋪 的效率及減低存貨成本及風險。補貨期間的相差越短,銷售的波動便越小,所以只要提高補貨的頻率便可以減少存貨要求。另外,同區的零售店大可共用一物流中 心,負責分流及共享存貨,也成為向生產體系訂貨的樞紐。這還需要驗貨改善、送貨循環路線安排及資訊系統的協調。生產體系寧可先保守地大量生產存貨,並在銷 售後商才選擇性地增產部份產品,或甚至進行JUST-IN-TMIE生產,以減少存貨的成本。

任何經營效率高的企業都有良好的生產及供貨體系支援,LVMT的生 產體系就是數個人一組的工作單位,可以進行JUST-IN-TIME生產,減低存貨要求的一個例子。

結語:
品牌策略、市拓技巧、物流及補貨系統、彈性而高效的生產系統、資訊 系統的介入支援、具創造力的研發組織及其他協力者的網絡管理等,雖不是本文章的重點,但其實都對零售商有很大的影響,不可不察。

以上就是我分析零售業的技巧及主張,是十分個人化、籠統化及不完整 的。我沒有再把零售業再細分,而為免文字過多,我也不舉太多例子及討論一般分析公司的相關技巧。然而,實際 上,要留意的事項及分析每間公司所需的調整,是會比這文章所寫的更為複雜及難撐握。這是我認為投資有必需專業化及為何投資分析可有利可圖的原因。我們需要 獨到的見解才能在市場中獲勝,股票市場也不例外。勤奮最終是會有回報的!

理論上的經濟周期:


低原材料->低通脹->低利息->工業投資上升+房地產上升->財 富效應->消費上升->產業利潤上升->增產->原材料需求上升+價格持續上升->壓縮產業鏈利潤->市場整合->低通脹之經濟增長->低息率->房地產 上升+財富效應->消費力增->房地產及消費品加價->通脹上升->利息上升->產業成本上升->通脹上升->利息上升->房地產回軟+資金流出債市>股 市+房地產+投資上升->財富效應->次級上升周期開始->周期循環->高息+高通脹+高房地產->金價上升+原材料價格上升->資金流出房地產市場&股 市->負財富效應->消費減少->股市跌+樓市跌->原材料生產過剩->原材料市場下跌->產業利潤回升->次級下降周期開始->低原材料+低利息+低通 脹。

大概是這樣吧~然而,實際上不容易看得出來。科技、政治、災難、政 策、國際貿易協定、國家經濟生命周期、資源差異、人口老化、全球化、消費模式改變、宏觀調控及戰爭等等,都影響著不同經濟體的經濟周期變化。

我們正在處於經濟的上升周期,原材料、產業利潤、房地產及消費循環 向上,利率及通脹也開始上升,黃金也開始上升。在經濟向上周期中,低資本投資及高競爭力的企業能夠獲取高經濟盈利增長,例如品牌持有者、產業壟斷者及低資 本的大規模企業。原材料及高資本成本領導者,獲利會暴升,但投資也大,長期實質增長其實不大。在高通脹及高息率時期,高息會壓抑高負債企業,而它們多就是 高資本投資類的公司,這更加使它們經營困難,以通脹更會把它們的實質增長壓低,實屬難以長期獲的的公司。股市對那類公司也是十分有周期性的,所以只要了解 整個周期的運作,便可以獲利甚豐了。當然,失敗的話,損失也會十分慘重。

雖然我們在經濟的上升周期,但究竟何時逆轉,我們是難以預料的。很 多經濟泡沫都是早應爆破的,但卻可維持一段長時間,使泡沫再大多一兩倍。因此,不能說有泡沫的情況就快要爆破,我們只能說它應該/傾向爆破。通常經濟逆轉 需要一些事件去改變人們的想法。例如經過多年陰跌後,再爆發SARS,這使人們對股市極為恐慌,最堅定的賣家也把籌碼拋出去了,剩下的就只有買家,在這誘 發下,配合很多基本的利好因素,所以之後便可有很可觀的升幅。

美國龐大的貿易赤字及多年的房地產泡沫已經蘊釀多時,油價及通脹趨 升一觸即發,何時及如何觸發,真的難以估計。我們可以做的,是做好隨時爆破的準備,準備適應後爆破時代的降臨~



2005年12月

Watching Retailers (4):


Today is Saturday. My mum and I go to Causeway bay to watch the retailers. In December, I.T group has started sale activities except for the Izzue brand. What's the strategy behind that?

1 Kingston Road and Paterson Road
At first, we arrive at Kinston Road. Dmop's big shops continue to underperform even it is on sale. When we arrive at I.T in the Kingston Road, I am surprised. There are a lot of people shopping in the shops. I think it is probably because it is the first few days of sales. I have heard that I.T sales is very powerful. It is my first time to witness how powerful it is.

Then we visit the shops of I.T in Kingston Road and Paterson Road. The number of visitor is just satisfactory even on sale. I.T said the rent there is very cheap because the group rent 1/2 of the street and it is the I.T group who rises the popularity of the street.  I think the free-standing shops there are still profitable. I.T group is still opening new shops there. b+ab and 5cm on the Paterson Street is still crowded with people. b+ab is really a magical brand of the I.T group.

2 Island Beveley
Then we visit the new izzue shop in Island Beveley(near Sogo). I read about that it has 7000sq. ft. I feel very worried about that. When I arrive there, people flow is good. The shopfloor design is quite intelligent. The big shops is divided into a lot of rooms. People won't feel stressful to enter such a big shops. It is also a sales shop of the izzue brand. I think it has all of the design of izzue. The rent is certainly expensive. Now, it is still not on sale. Let's see if it can be successful later when it is on sale.

3 Times Square
After that, we go to Times Square, the greatest mall in Causeway Bay. The people flow is terrible. Most of them has high purchasing power. I think it is just like the Festival Walk or Habour City. We visited Dmop first. The performance is still so-so. I think Dmop won't be harmful for the I.T group at this moment. The difference of popularity and bargaining power is quite large. Above Dmop, it is French Connection. The brand is quite successful. I think it has become the best free-staning brand since the first year it joins the I.T group.

The Zara in Times Square is powerful. Many people shops and purchase in Zara. I can see many people are holding their packaging bags. The location of the shops is excellent. It is next to the busyest escalator of  2/F and 3/F.

b+ab and i.t is next to the busyest esculator on 4/F. The location is also very good. The shops is crowded with a lot of people. I think the visitor/area ratio can be 3-4times that of Dmop. As expected, there are ~30 visitors in the small b+ab shop.

4 Granville Road
There are a lot of individual fashion bontique in TST. I think the competition is very large. The shops of I.T group there do not outperform obviously. The rent is high. I think the shops there may not be profitable.

5 Sun Arcade
The F.C.K group there is quite good. It has outperform the I.T group and Dmop. Dmop is still the worst player. Yan told me that F.C.K group is not bad. I believe her.

6 Silvercord
It is the main base of the I.T group in TST. The mall is obviouly less expensive than Times Square. However, the shops there is just underperform the Causeway Bay shops slightly except for the I.T. The I.T in Kingston Road is really busy. I think the I.T group is very profitable in Silvercord. The Sales shops is not affected by the discount activity of the I.T group.

7 Habour City
There are many great brands in Habour City. People flow and their purchasing power are both maximum. The Zara there is really eye-catching. It has outperform Esprit significantly in sales and retail management. Suddenly, I doubt if Esprit can outperform Zara in Europe. If the management is ....

我的投資成績表:


1中石油
買入時間:03年5月
買入平均價位:$2
原因:經濟最低潮,強勁財務及壟斷,巴菲特增持
賣出時間:03年10月
賣出平均價位:$3.8
原因:認為石油業長遠跟隨經濟增長,價值反映後便不值得長期持有
2005年12月股價:$6
結論:成功的買入,成功的賣出
-雖然股價後來還急升,但一年後還維持在$4水平。套利後可投資到 其他公司。
學習:
-第一次體驗投資股票的獲利威力
-明白價值及耐性的重要性,不要止賺
2大慶石化
買入時間:03年6月
買入平均價位:$0.27
原因:高增長,低PE,純粹出自財務數字的分析
賣出時間:03年7月
賣出平均價位:$0.37
原因:高receivable, 弱現金流,難以明白的Profit Margin
現價:$0.37(最高$0.7)
結論:失敗的買入,成功的賣出
學習:
-財務分析必要結合經營分析才可靠
-錯的決定可短期賺錢;對的決定可短期蝕錢
3超大現代
買入時間:03年6月
買入平均價位:$0.89
原因:高增長,低PE,純粹出自財務數字分析
賣出時間:03年7月
賣出平均價位:$0.84
原因:弱現金流,難以明白的Profit Margin
DEC/05股價:$3
結論:失敗的買入,成功的賣出
學習:
-如果我的思路正確,賺少了也是對的
-忍耐原因不明機會損失的心理,建立以“做對為本”的投資思考


3毅力工業
初次買入時間:03年7月
買入平均價位:$2.4
原因:長期財務,業務簡單,有成功轉型經驗,外判趨勢,新產品
賣出時間:04年10月
賣出平均價位:$1.95(期中收取 ~$0.25股息)
原因:業務轉型失敗
現價:$1.1(最低$0.8)
結論:不成熟的投資分析,成功的賣出
學習:
1從經營角度出發去止蝕的經驗
2明白低增值行業的風險
3明白產業及產品分析的重要性

4葉氏化工
初次買入時間:03年7月
買入數量及平均價位:$1.4
原因:管理層,週期性行業中穩定性的機會優勢,上游壟斷,下游市場 廣,隨經濟增長,市場看淡公司,價格吸引,可接觸管理層
賣出:沒有賣出(現價$2.2,未計$0.2x股息)
結論:成功的投資
學習:
1市場對行業的總體評價對個別公司影響大,並可產生評估錯誤
2市場重視短期因素,是獲得好投資的機會

5中國製藥:
初次買入時間:04年1月
買入價位:$2.6
原因:國際競爭力,成本領先,本地消費增長潛力,高增值產品轉移
賣出時間04年7月
賣出價位:$2.2
現價:$1.3
原因:惡性競爭,管理層假承諾,弱現金流,業內規則混沌
結論:不成熟的技巧,成功的賣出
學習:
1惡性競爭的行業沒有前途
2週期性行業只適宜在最低潮買入
3週期性行業的市場資訊效率較高
4第一次詳細地分析公司

6金衛醫療
初次買入時間:04年1月
買入價位:$2.7
原因:壟斷,國際競爭力,返單市場,合理產品組合,業務簡單&真 實,強勁內需&長遠市場
賣出時間:04年7月
賣出價位:$3
原因:公司發展非核心業務,收購使現金流持續不良
現價:$1.2(未拆細=$2.4)
結論:不成熟的投資技巧,成功的賣出
學習:
1管理層的發展思路對投資很重要
2小心創業板及歷史短的公司
3善用Google對調查公司的好處

7創科實業
初次買入時間:04年9月
買入價位:$10.8
原因:國際競爭力,品牌,良好歷史及管理層,價格急跌而便宜
賣出時間:04年9月(兩星期內)
賣出價位:$14.5
原因:購併不便宜,風險較高,管理層離職,價格急升,價值迅速被反 映
現價:$20
結論:成功的買入,成功的賣出
-股價雖增長,但風險增高;我的同期投資回報遠高於此增長。
學習:
1在無理的恐慌時,是最好的買入時間;在無理的希望中,是最好的賣 出時間
2價值投資是不應該考慮買賣之間的時間
3小心Second-system effect

8新確科技
初次買入時間:04年11月
買入平均價位:$1.4
原因:國際競爭力,競爭性低,顧客關係良好,市場定價很低
賣出時間:05年1月
賣出價位:$2.45
原因:價值被反映(FY05目標價$2.8)
現價:$1.5
原因:競爭力被中國同業競爭減弱,創意會計,新產品換代失望
結論:成功的買入,成功的賣出
學習:
1計入機會成本地考慮買入或賣出
2明人入股是良好的價值反映時機
3股價急升最後多導致高估,宜分段賣出。
4集中投資的好處

9愛高
初次買入時間:04年12月
買入平均價位:$2.2
原因:盈利驚喜,定價便宜,股價升幅不能反映盈利增長
賣出時間:05年
賣出平均價格:$2.7(目標$3)
原因:不看好組裝業,盈利增長因素被反映,機會成本及風險考慮。
現價:$3.1
結論:成功的買入,成功的賣出
學習:
1盈利驚喜可以是一個安全而回報的的投資機會,但要小心分析公司質 素
2產品週期及成本分析十分重要

10晶門科技
初次買入時間:05年2月
買入平均價位:$2.2
原因:行業增長及潛力,管理層及歷史,國際唯一的競爭模式,強勁財 務及商業模型,技術及關係優勢,可接觸管理層;市場對公司業務不明白,定價反映風險,卻未能反映晶門增長潛力。
賣出時間:05年11月
平均賣出價格:$2.9x(未計$0.16股息)
原因:唯一的模式有淡化風險,產業整體競爭性升溫,風險增高,新業 務差於預期;Samsung戰略介入下游風險;後產品價格下跌高於預期;價值被反映,價格同時反映風險及潛力。機會成本考慮。
現價:$3.3
結論:成功的買入,賣出結論未明
-我的目標價為$3.8,但在風險及機會成本的考慮下,暫沽售全部 持股。當風險減低或股價下跌至足以抵消風險時,會考慮再次買入。
學習:
1細緻的產業分析、產品及週期分析及系統性行業資訊,可獲得準確的 預測能力
2越複雜的公司,市場反應越是趨向短視
3市場無理的同業比較可導致優勢公司被低估
4風險在於自己對公司的認識,而不是公司本身
5信心可以在細緻的分析後獲得
6投資複雜公司,待股價急跌時買入,待股價快速反映時賣出,宜備資 金&股票。

回報:
03年:42%
04年:39%
05年:63%(暫時,今個月尾結算)

總結:
好高興的是近年的投資成績很好之餘,智識增長也很快速。我由只懂看 數字,變成懂看公司基本面;再由懂看基本面,變得懂選擇某一些公司來看;最後,還變得會考慮downsize為先,心理質素也成熟了不少,即使持反向意 見,也可以有信心。不過有趣的是,我差不多每次投資一隻股票後,也會覺得自己未來不會再買那些股票。除了後期技巧開始成熟之外,起初好多投資是失敗的。後 期雖然有成績,但我認為幸運的因素是存在的。雖然我自己的買入或賣出價總是很差的,而很多時大市向上時,我都是持有沒用的股票,但最後價值反映是如此的 快,所以也讓我獲利不少了。其實我一直想改善自己的買入及賣出的時機,但暫時,真的想不到更好的辦法了,或許研究多時的金融心理學可以幫上一把,但要把零 散的理論組織起來試驗,成功後再實行...真的很不易呢!

越在金融市場上,體驗的事就越多。我喜歡巴菲特的形容,投資的好處 是,人會變得越來越利害!近年是我投資的第三年,我想七年後,即是投資的第十年,我的技巧將會比現在還要大幅提升。那是我很有興趣見倒的!究竟那時我會在 做什麼呢?如果我可以識倒七年後的我就好了!

現在的投資策略是,最好是勁公司,次要就是會變勁的公司。前者因為 成日都好貴,所以等兩三年先有一次機會買倒。後者風險看似較大,但如果自己的知識可以涉及到該公司的專業知識,那便可有提高把握,降低風險了。我很難相信 金融市場上有很多人可以像我一去集中去分析一些單一的中小型公司,那是需要很廣的知識基礎,很多的時間及很大的動機才可以做到的。我相信這樣的人會去分析 較重要的公司,所以在中小型公司上,我相信自己會有一些優勢。7年之後,這個優勢將會繼續變大,到時候事情會變得更有趣了!

<<Fashion Brand>>:


近來看的好書之一,它是一記者的採訪總結,主要講述世界級品牌如 LV, Dior, Gucci, Burberry, Armani, Nike, Harven Nichols, Zara等,將不同Fashion界的觀點構成一個Fashion界的圖畫。我強烈推廌對Fashion有興趣的人看此書!

今日出旺角,一口氣買了五本非大陸書...還是第一次呢!
1豐田系統的原點(豐田訪問錄)
2集客力(長野慶太,關於拉斯維加斯)
3全球舞台大未來(大前研一)
4超常識經營術(關於鈴木敏文)
5找這樣的公司就對了(藤野英人)
五本都是出自日本作者,可知我對日本管理的很有興趣呢~

一股投資法:


好處:
1潛在回報高
2Economic of Intelligence,善用好的IDEA
3可以好深入研究及觀察公司
4對任何影響公司的資料都十分敏感
5更容易掌握公司及其行業,對學習很有幫助
6有機會獲得比市場更準確及更快的資訊。
7較容易跟管理層溝通

壞處:
1冇動機看其他股
2心理壓力大
3回報率較波動
4較大機會承受重大損失

結論:
1任何情況下,我也不建議
2即使只有一個有效的IDEA,也寧願持有少量現金,對保持理性很 有幫助
3可選擇2-3持股,寧持有少量較次等的公司。

Process of Analysis:


Question:
hi Franky,
I would like to know how you do the company analysis? Especially the flow
and its deliverale.(Step1: Do AAA -->> Output BBB)

Answer:
I don't think in this way in my analysis. Usually, I wanna find out
1Whether the industry is good
2Whether the company is good
3Whether the price is good
I don't have any fixed processes to figure them out. Every company is
different.

One of the principles of Chinese Medicine diagnosis is called "以常達變". If
you know what is right, you will know what is wrong. Therefore, I would
recommend learning right business philosophy from great companies around the
world first, then you will know what to look for. I believe there is no
short cut.

2005年11月

My view on the management of I.T:


1 Managemnet borrow money from 999
999 had an ugly balanced sheet before the IPO. the managmenet had borrowed
money from the company. But during the IPO, all the transaction has been eliminated.
There is no further borrowing from the company after the IPO. I think there
may be off-balance sheet borrowing that i can't notice, but at least at this
moment, i can't find evidence to prove that the management has problem. For
the pre-IPO period, I would tolerate the borrowing because it was a privately
owned company. If 999's managmenet has not done anything bad after IPO, i think
it is okay. But of course, it is necessary to keep an eye on and be sensitive
on that.

2 pre-IPO dividend and CB:
Many companies has reward scheme during IPO, they includes some best run companies.
There is no further CB, option and other similiar incective scheme after the
IPO. I have no evidence to say 999 has poor management after the IPO.

3 Director's fee
It is kept at 0.8% of sales or ~7% of the earning. I think the rate is satisfactory.
There is no option or CB issued after the IPO

4 Managemnet opertaional ability:
It is what I highly concern. I think bad management are usually bad business
operators. Up to now, I find that 999's operational intelligence is very good.
It has done many right things, from pricing policy, shopfloor management,
desgn and packaging, to complementor management, opening and location of shops
etc. I have visited many big malls. I think 999's shops has outperformed most
of the shops, not only its competitors. If 999's shops are not profitable,
how can other shops survive?

5 Dividend Policy
It is the point remained to be see. It has announced that the dividend policy
will be 40% payout ratio, once a year. Last year, it has followed his promise.
In 06H1, there is no dividend. So, let's see what 999 will do in the next half.

6 Relationship with the celebrity:
I think it can be both good and bad. The advantages of being friends with the
celebrity is that you can have powerful promotional power. Many singers and
movie stars are the friends of the chairman, if you read the fashion news from
google, u will find that the celebrity has helped 999's a lot. For the bad
points, I think you can understand.

7. The need of IPO
I think 999 can choose not to offer IPO, but it would miss a golden chance
and has to risk the financial pressure from the consolidation of the retail
marketing in 06-07. 999 is not cash rich before the IPO, but it has good operational
cashflow. The cashflow can support the opening of new shops and rennovation
in HK. However, because the business in china is not profiting, the growth
of the China business will extract a lot of cash from 999. The faster the growth,
the more cash it would draw. Also, financial strength is the consideration
of banks and shop-mall owners. If 999 is not financially competitive than its
competitors, it would have to risk failure in bargaining good store location
and rental contract. There are factors other the rents that count. On the other
hand, 06-07 is likely to be the consolidation period of the retail industry.
Many brands had opened shops aggressive in 03-05. Now, rent start to pick up.
Some shops or brand has to be closed down and it releases more room from competitive
brands to expand. Think about that, if rent doesn't rise, how can 999 open
the big "i.t" in Festival Walk? how come 2% has given up its shop in Mong Kok
while 999 can keep the shops and expand its advertisement board there? How
important is the financial strenght?To conclude I think 999's IPO has good
reasons behind.


So, why do u think the management of 999 is bad? I am also highly interested
in that. I am no defending 999, but evidence is necessary to justify the integrity.
I can tolerate the some weak hint/evidence by enough margin of safety.

Risk of the I.T group:

1The company underperform the whole retail industry and margin is therefore sqeezed by rise in rental and staff cost.
2 Public interests on the in-house brand has changed or commodized by competitors e.g. D-mop.
3 Change of strategic focus.
4 Unreasonable financial operation
5 Lost of critical pesonnel in retail management.
6 Lost of critical licecne contracts, probably Arnold Palmer in 06
7 Failure of the China business.
8 HR risk associated as the companies grows.
9 Overexpansion of stores and saturation of interests of the consumers.

After all, this is what I believe:
If I am right, I gain money. If I am wrong, I lose money.
If I am wrong and I don't lose money, that's not right.
If I am right and don't gain money, that's not right.

自己出現在Fool.com


The Motley Fool Discussion Boards
Subject: Re: Investing in 2005 isn't just a USA game anym
Date: 11/21/05 1:17 AM
Number: 111539
Author: xyberc
URL: http://boards.fool.com/Message.asp?mid=23327058

On a brighter note, let me try to add my 1 cent from my particular perspective
as a HK Chinese living in Tokyo; who used to study in the U.S. (some 20+ years
ago), then worked in New York, London, and Tokyo. I was fortunate enough to
have crossed path with a lot of very talented individuals (Americans, European,
Japanese, Indian, Chinese) at school as well as at work (and at this board, no
kidding!).

What you said didn't surprise me a bit. Many foreigners are as smart and
industrial as the best in America. Just look around at the best U.S.
universities and research institutes. It was true many years ago as it is true
now.

IMHO, America would probably not be where it is today economically had it not
been its open door immigration policy that attracts the best and the brightest
from all over the world. When I was in the U.S. some 20 years ago, the best
and the brightest foreign students wanted to be part of the American Dream.
However, I believe the sentiment has changed somewhat. An ever-larger group of
the best and the brightest foreign students would like to return home,
sometimes after acquiring certain work experiences in a more advanced country,
because home is probably where they can achieve their biggest successes. The
differences of now from then are: 1) more countries allow economic freedom and
subscribe to the protection of private property ownership (but corruption is
still a problem being addressed); 2) Information is more readily available over
the internet and thus knowledge is more accessible from a far distance; 3) U.S.
adopts a more conservation stance and is generally perceived as more hostile to
foreigners given the security issue (sorry ?I don't mean to be political. But
it is all in the perception); 4) they do have the advantage knowing the
language and the culture, plus stronger network and connection. If I were an
ambitious new graduate today, I would first acquire the appropriate
professional experiences and then put myself where the biggest economical
growth may be in the next 20 ?30 years. It would be Shanghai for a Chinese.

I may have digressed a bit, but regarding value investors in other parts of the
world, I would give two examples in HK. The first one is more serious and the
second one is interesting.

1) Value Partners Fund

http://www.valuepartners.com.hk/main.htm

19.3% annual compounded return since inception in April 1993 vs. 6.7% for the
HK Hang Seng Index. Note that the 12y+ record spans the Asian financial crisis
in the late 90's.

2) a 22 year old university student of Chinese medicine

?who achieves a 30% - 40% annual return since he starts stock picking from two
years ago, while studying a vigorous course of Chinese medicine. It's really
not blind luck. His rationales and analysis make good sense for the most part,
at least for his stage of development. I think he has the right stuff to be a
very good value investor given good mentorship. However, I'm afraid that most
of the information about him is in Chinese. He is not yet widely known.

http://diary.showhappy.net/?id=135251&page=1
(his web diary is mostly in Chinese. Trust me on this one ?you'll be
impressed if you can read it)

My point is there have always been bright value investors outside of the
Western world. It's just hard for people to know them except for the locals.

My Quotes about risk and sales of stocks:


1I've never expected I can sell at the top.
2I usually sell stocks when the price is rising.
3The stocks I sold is likely to rise because of the momentum.
4I think it is accurate to sell before it rise and inaccurate to sell when it doesn't.
5Valuation is risk-adjusted, so a stock can rise if the risk is decreased by time.
6It is intelligent to avoid siginifcant downrisk by giving up comparable upside potential.
7Risky event can either happen or not happen, but never be predicted.
8It is intelligent to buy safe idea aggressively than risky idea speculatively.
9Sell if margin of safety cannot protect from uncertainty.

Watching retailers:


Today, I go to Shatin Plaza to watch the retailers. Taiichi Ohio teach me that I can learn a lot by simply watching. It is my first time to practise his teaching and I find it very useful.

1 Benetton&Esprit:
First, I go to Esprit and Benetton. They are great global retailers. My brother said Benetton is likely to be Esprit's biggest competitors in the U.S. That's why I am interested in watching Benetton. Benetton's shop is smaller and there is less number of products. The people flow is both about the same. But I still appreciate Esprit much because of her better branding techniques like its eye-catching full-red gift box, the variation of clothes models and bigger and more comfortable shopfloor arranagement.

2 F.C.K group and 2% group:
They are on sales. Why do I know? Because there are big and eye-catching sales notices board in front of the shops. There are also many sales notices all around the shops. The discount is like 40% to 70%. The style is okay, but shopfloor is small and crowded. ASP is about $150. People flow of the two group is both normal, just a little more than Esprit. The clothes are placed on the tables like a small hill. Experience is not really good. But they are cheap. They attract price sentitive and younger customers.

3 izzue, b+ab, double park and 5cm
izzue is upgrading its brand, ASP is above $300. People flow is normal. Shopfloor is much bigger than F.C.K group, 2% group and I.T.'s sub-brand shops. No sales notice. Catalog available. Sales is continuous slowly.

b+ab is a big success. Over the 1 hours I watch, over 80% of the sales counter is saturated. Customers quene to purchase their clothes. Shopfloor is small but with design in clothes display. Display table is not tidy, probably because too many customers. I am sure the shops is extremely profitable. ASP about $200. No sales notice.

Experience of shopping in double-park is special. Shopfloor design is differentiated. People flow is not good. ASP about $300. Sales is not continuous. No sales notice.

5cm's shopfloor is small, but design is unique. ASP is about $400. People is between izzue and b+ab. Sales is continuous. No sales notice.

In the busiest ground of the Shatin Plaza,  there is an eyecatching advertisment of these brands.

4 i.t and Dmop:
There is a stair to go to i.t in izzue. Experience is good because of space and lighting effect.  I walk around i.t. and izzue for three times in an hour. People flow is similiar. People flow of i.t is better than my expectation. Sales is continuous. Packaging is great.  It is eye-catching and can be seen frequently in the Plaza. Some girls even use it as their hand-carry. ASP is about $50(300-1000). Music effect is impressive. Shopfloor design is comfortable. Good contrast. Overall, it is even better than Esprit. No sales notice.

Dmop is just next to i.t. Dmop shopfloor is dim. People flow is less but satisfactory. Customer's age is older than i.t surprisingly. ASP is about 400. Lighting effect is okay. Shopfloor design and music is normal. Shopfloor area is about 1/3 of i.t. Colour
contrast is a bit disappointing. Packaging is quite good. No sales notice.

I stand in front of both of the shops and watch for 15 minutes. People flow is obviously better in i.t than Dmop. Crowdness is similiar because i.t is much bigger. Both of them are in a satisfactory level. Sales seems smaller in Dmop. Sales in both shops are continuous while i.t has a higher rate.

5 Citysuper and Mark&Spencer
Citysuper is an mpressive and differertiated premium supermarket. People flow is good. Products are premium, unique and of good quality. In-house food is attractive. In the end, I have made my only purchase in citysuper: A piece of garlic cheese. Catalog is availble but in English only. Bakery is crowded with ASP $10, sales is close to saturation. Overall, it is very successful. No sales notice. Shopping experience is good.

Mark&Spencer has mainly attracted family and mature customers. Sales is non-continuous. Product is normal. Gift product is eye-catching. In-house sweets and snacks attract customers and sales. Few sales notice. Full of Christimas concept. Shopping experience is warm.

6 Giodano and Baleno
They are in the busiest groundfloor. Obvious sales notice everywhere. Shopfloor is middle in size. Poor space, music, contrast effect and packaging. Sales is continuous. ASP around $50.

What I think:
Today, premium retailers has generally performed much better than disocunt retailers. Customer flow is not affected by sales notices and price. Shopping experience and product uniqueness/identity dominate customer flow and sales. Why is it?

It is always heard that rise in interest rate will harm customer demand. I totally disagree with it. If you are clever enough, you will agree with me. Financial community is fooled by conventional theories because they don't understand the background and assumption of the theories. They fail to understand the reality and the theories. I mean they actually understand nothing at all. They are professional with a hammer.

Let's go to the point. Interets certainly won't harm customer demand. Only the outlook of the future do. The economy is going up in these year. People has become optimistic and are more confirmed this year than last year.  If you don't believe that, go to watch in big malls for 2 hours.

I believe premium retailers will outperform discount retailers continuously. Toshifumi Suzuki of 7-11 Japan is so intelligent that he has noticed the phenmenon for 20 years. Customers behavior has transformed from homogenously price-sensitive to quality and experience sensitive. Quality includes a diversity of needs, including both physically and metaphysically.
 
Even there is a downturn, I think the behavior of consumer market will be still different from the manufacturer market. In the manufacturer market, customers would is still price sensitive. They will buy less and buy only needed. In the consumer market, customer would become expenditure sensitive. They will buy less, but not cheaper. They will buy only the best one.

Retailing industry less efficient than b2b industies. It is likely because of the consistency tendency, limited and biased memory, association of the consumers. At that same time, the capacity is large because market share is not self-reinforcing like the b2b market. Profitability tend to be stable because aggressive pricing is not a feasisble strategy to achieve sustainable success.

I would appreciate brands and premium products more in the future.


Watching Retailers (2):


Today is sunday. My brother and I go to APM, Festvial Walk and TST. Overall, we have spent about 5 hours to watch the retailers. But because we are too late to go to TST, we fail to observe what we expect in the end. So let's me talk about what we have observed in APM and Festival Walk(FW).

1 APM experience
In APM, we walk from the lowest to the toppest ground. APM is very sucessful, people flow is between FW and Shatin New Twon Plaza.

We first arrive at Dmop, one of the I.T imitator. The shopfloor design is satisfactory, envirionment is bright, but space is a little too loose. Safa is not comfortable and disappointingly unattractive in the shoes areas. People flow is okay, similar with izzue, but because the shop is big, so people flow seems loose. Music effect is okay. No sales notice. Sales rate is low. Dmop's packaging is not common in APM

izzue:
Then we arrive at  izzue. Design is conventional. Music effect is good. People flow is continuous satisfactorily. Sales rate is low. No sales notice.

5cm
Then we are directed to 5cm. Design is conventional. Music effect is not strong. People flow is good and a bit crowded. Sales rate is better than izzue. No sales notice.

ETE:
In front of 5cm, it is ETE, the shoes retailing platform. Design is eye-catching. Music effect is not strong. People flow is good. Safa is seducing. Many people sit there to try shoes. Sales rate is good. No sales notice. Sales are busy. It performs much better than shoes section in Dmop.

i.t loves Mickey, Arnold Palmer:
Next to ETE, it is i.t loves mickey and Arnold Palmer, the two licensed brand of I.T group. Packaging is good. Girls use Arnold Palmer's packaging as their hand-carry. Packaging is common in APM. People flow is quite good. Sales is a bit busy. Shopfloor design is obviously higher-class, display is on available close to human height, shopfloor is wide and comfortable. Because people flow is good, shopfloor is not loose. Decoration is low-cost, effect is good. Arnold Palmer is a big success. No sales notice. Music effect is not strong

B+ab:
Out of the shop, it is b+ab. It is the main target of our visit today. Expectedly, b+ab is amazing. People flow is satuated. Sales rate is saturated and continuous. Some boys are waiting outside the shop. Sales is unnoticable except for the sales in the counter. Clothes are placed chaotically like a mess. Music effect is very strong. No sales notice. I believe the shop is highly profitable.

I have visited those shops a few times in the two hours visit. The situation is similliar. I am delighted by the dressing arranagement of the sales, music effect and shopfloor design in general.

bread&butter
If you think b+ab is just one of the normal traffic feminine fashion shops, then you are probably wrong. There is a shop called "bread&butter" next to b+ab. You will be surprised that b+ab is so satuated while bread&butter is so quiet. It is easy to see the three sales in bread&butter standing and feeling bored there. Eye-catching sales notice. Clothes is okay. Brand is not unpopular. But it is just quiet. If you don't believe there, go to APM for two hours and watch patiently in detail.

K-2
Going up a level, we meet K-2. The shop is bigger than B+ab, but the people flow is probably can't reach 1/3 of B+ab. Sales notice is big and appear everywhere. Music effect is not obvious. ASP is $1xx. Cheap location.

Bauhaus and Salad:
They are disappointing. People flow is low, the shop is quiet. Shopfloor is quite big, but the location is bad(too high). For such an expensive product, it should be placed in the low floorground where buying desire and purse wealth the strongest while fatignity is the lowest. Also it should stick to levi's and cheviron to assoaciate the brand and enjoy the network effect. Sales notices is obviously availble. Few customers. Sales feel boring. A total failure.

2% group:
Going two level up, we meet 2% group. The floor is halfly occupied by 2%. I think this 2% shops is the biggest one. It has all sub-brands there. Shopfloor plan of ODF is okay, but there is too much inventory. It is difficult to pick up the clothes. Also, sales notice is everywhere and noticable. ASP is $1xx. STUFF is eye-catching and has a obviously better people flow. However, sales is rare because the products are mostly impractical. People just wanna take a look. The main 2% and +-x / both suffer from "sales notice" and quiet shopfloor. Likely affected by bad location of the shop. 2% group fails to general people flow in the isolated conner by itself. Isolation from busy area is a risky practice.

Overalll, APM is a great success. People flow is continuously strong. Up to now, the outperformance of I.T group over the others is still obviously. However, I believe it is unintelligent to confirm the situation by one single visit. Dmop, F.C.K group and 2% group will upgrade and catch in the future. We have to keep an eye on the improved version continuously.

2 Festival Walk experience:
The people flow of FW is amazing. The crowdness of FW is less than APM, but we can't underesimate the purchasing power of the minor. FW is a higher class mall. People who shops there are usually maturer, brand sensitive and have higher purchasing power. That's why I pick FW as my target visit location today. It is so important!

There, we can't find any direct competitors of I.T sub-brands. It is likely because the rental requiremetn and risk is too high. It is one of the advantages of scale and branding. So let's see how i.t is doing there!

I.T:
We first visit one of the few I.T shops in Hong Kong. I.T is a retail platform of high premium fashion products. The shop is just up a floor from the KCR. Frontdoor is eye-catching. Shopfloor decoration is excellent, probably the best in FW. People flow is satisfactory. Shopfloor is wide, fittest the high premium requirement. The sales is professional. No sales-notice, of course. Sales rate is loose. I see a scene which impress my brother and me a lot: A pretty girl, who is carrying two big I.T packaging bags, hug his boyfriend with highly satisfied mood. The boy then said " so you have finished buying. Happy and satisfied la, so where should we go next?" The couple are both very satisfied at that time. That's my first time to feel the power of luxury. It's amazing and valuable!

i.t:
Then we go to the i.t next to page one. I just know there is an i.t. I think it is a newly opened shop this year. Using shape orange as its main theme of decoration, the i.t is very eye-catching. It is the key to people-flow and purchasing mood. The products are expensive expectedly. Surprising there is a good-looking stair inside the i.t. Up the stair, there are the Beams Boy series. The invesment of the shopfloor design should be quite large and the rental contract should be quite long. It is hard to belive a fashion retailer can have such a complex internal design. Even other premium retailers in FW fail to do that. The I.T group is really aggressive and experienced in brand building. I think they are doing right and doing well. People flow is good. I can feel the shop is busy but not crowded. Sales rate is good, packaging can be seen ocassionally throughtout the FW. Music effect is not especially strong. Viscal seduction is excellent. I like to shop there.

B+ab, 5cm, Izzue:
Next to the upper door of i.t, there are the in-house brands. The situation is similar to the APM. Perhaps people flow is not as much, but the sales rate is similiar. I can see the packaging bag oftenly in FW.

Viva You, FCUK:
The shop is quite quiet. Decoration is normal. Not really good at all. Perhaps FCUK is a bit better.

Moiselle:
It is just in front of the i.t in-house brands. The clothes are good. But people floor is rare. But frankly, for a clothes with >75% gross margin, rare purchasing is enough.(rare, i don't mean there is no customer inside).

I.T Sales Shop:
Surprisingly, it is located inside izzue. The clothes are cheap. Many are having 70% discount. Even my price/value sensitive brother purchase a shoes there. I believe all the products are the written-off inventory. So revenue is equal to gross profit. In the FW, you can see the packaging bags of I.T Sales shop frequently. The business is good! Frankly, it is really quite valuable if you can find something suitable for you there. I will shop for myself there again!

3 Silvercord Plaza:
After having meal in McDonald, we go to the main base of I.T group, the Silvercord. The whole mall is at least 60% occupied by I.T group. But it is already 8:45pm at that time, people flow is satisfactory only, not really great. Dmop is opened there too. Same as other Dmop, i.t still outperform it. Dmop 1.0 has to improve in the future. If I.T group continue to scale up, Dmop will find it difficult to compete. Low inventory turnover will also decrease the competitiveness of Dmop. They are urgent to change.

In the mall, I have heard another scene which impressive a lot. Here is the conversation:
Girl: let's go to XXX(one of the i.t shop), the coat looks good.
boy: it is expensive, also the texture is thin.
Girl: if you wanna looks good, you have to pay more.

TST is not really crowded tonight. I think we have to go there earlier next time, and perhaps on weekdays. I will go to watch the shops again!

What I think:
Dressing arranagement of the sales is important. Bread&butter 's sales are dressed in eye-catching yellow clothes, but they are too outstanding. The age and appearnace of sales are also importnat. I think Dmop fail to run the shop well is partly because the sales are too young and unprofessional. They are even younger than me while their target customers should be around 2x to 4x. The dressing of them are also too "mK". The brand manager is not catious enough on the detail. Or perhaps resource is not enough for Dmop to do that.

Currently, I.T group has increasing scale and capital advantage. Brand value is increasing these years. I remember B+ab is not as strong as now. Izzue's promotional poster is not as strong as now. i.t shopfloor decoration and design are not as strong as now.  There weren't 5cm at all, double park ETE at all. In short term, I am confident that the I.T group will outperform the other fashion retailers continuously.

One downside is that the 2.0 version of the competitors is very great. I think it would first harm the in-house brands which are having direct competition with them. For I.T and i.t shop, the decoration and promotional skill is still difficult to imiate in a short time.

Rental cost is not necessily bad for the I.T group. Actually, why are there so many competitors, trying to imitate I.T group? Why can they expand fast even they underperform the I.T group so much? Rise in rental cost will bring everything back to normal. I think it is more difficult for the competitors to chase I.T in the future. I.T can be benefitted by high rental cost if they can control the cost internally well.

Watching Retailer (3):


Watching Retailer(3):

Today is Monday. I continue my investigation of the I.T group. This time, the target is Mong Kok. Mong Kok is a different battle field from Shatin and Festival Walk. People flow is high but purchasing power is relatively low,. So you can see that sales/visit ratio is low generally. But of course, this phenonmenon vary from area to area within Mong Kok too.

1 Langham Plaza.

This is an new and successful mall in Mong Kok. It is built with an office beside. Decoration and shopfloor design is excellent. Therefore, it can attract consumers with higher purchasing power. Today, I have stood in front of the in-house brand shops for an hour. People flow of the whole mall is low from 4pm to 6pm. But the sales/visit is good. I have noticed that consumer is usually in pairs. If a group people enter a shop, it is rare to see a transaction. After 6pm, the people flow and sales/visit increase. Probably because there is more consumers with high purchasing power. I can see many OL and OL+BF shopping throughout Langham Plaza.

i.t is in the 3/F of Langham Plaza. The location is quite bad. It is behind a escalator. Environment is dim. However, the front door is design intelligently. The frontdoor is a clear-shape, blue in colour with a big icon of "i.t". It is easy to notice the shop because it contrast with Langham plaza's design which is complex and brown-yellow. The frontdoor windows is designed intellignetly too. We can look inside the shops from outside, so you won't be afraid of the quietness of the shop. When u enter the shops, you can continue even it is quiet. Actually, the shops is more busy than my expectation. I expect it is bad because of the location, but the design and brand name really turnaround it. It is common to see the eye-catching i.t packaging in the mall. Sale/visit is not really good. But people flow is really satisfactory, outperforming SEIBU and other fashion competitors. Susprising 5CM is arranged in i.t this time. Also, I just know that  40% off on the second purchase is called "pre-sale". Now, it is the pre-sale period~

2% group 's location is 2-3floor upper, it is bad. People flow is small. Inventory pile up. I am disappoited.

F.C.Kgroup is one floor upper than the in-house brand complex. People flow is just a bit smaller than the in-house brand. Sales/visit is so-so. I am disappointed by the packaging. Colour is dull, and with a big "Sales" on the bag. I can hardly notice the brand name on the packaging. Sale-notice everywhere. Quality of sales is quite good, they are polite and good-looking.

Bread&butter is in front of the in-house brand complex. it's clothes are good, but people flow is low. The "quiet" and "idle sales" effect still affect the shop much. 50% off now.

Bauhaus and Salad is opened together in front of F.C.K group. Shops are small, people flow is low. I can only see the packaging 3-5 times today. 50% off now.

2 In's Square area.

It is one of the oldest i.t shop. The shop design and decoration is obviously old compared with that in other malls. People flow is close to zero at 4:30pm.  People increase obviously after 6:00pm. Sales rate increase a lot too. The shop is crowded with people at 8:00pm. The packaging of i.t, 5cm, b+ab and izzue is common in MK. It is my first time to see i.t.'s "puzzle" brand. Sales and design are both satisfactory. I think students are not the target customer of the I.T now. Overall, I am disappointed by the design and decoration of the shop. It should renovate it as soon as possible.

Walking around In's square, I find that the old 2% shop is closed down. I think it is probably because of the increase in rent on the busy street. I can't find K-2 there too.

3. Grand Plaza

I visit Grand Plaza at 9:20pm. People flow is low. Probably becuase I am too late.

b+ab's people flow okay, but it is the worst one already.

Double-park is like closed down. I asked the sales of b+ab if double-park is closed down. She answered: no, it is opened, just walk up the stair to enter" haha, I have made a mistake. It is opened. Surpsingly the store is full of people. I can see several sales in 10 minutes and the consumer are female. It is really out of my expectation. Double-park quite suit the style of MK. I have to visit the shops again later.

izzue is still in fall-style and on sales. People flow is bad. Generally, izzue always have poor people flow and sales. I am concerned about that.

2% group has poor people flow. On sale now. The group has a lot of inventory of door and accessory this year. I wonder how the group will treat them.

What I think:

I.T group obviously has a higher market share in Mong Kok than its competitors. However, the product of I.T group are quite unaffordable for the people there. I can see many no-brand retail store are crowded with people. The ASP is $4x. The store in Langham Plaza is a big success. I can't see its closest competitor Dmop there. I think I.T group's scales has given the group a better priority in occupying good store location. The store location in Festival Walk, APM and Langham plaza has proven that. Also, financial strength also help I.T group to stay in costly area e.g. IN's square. I think the store is not highly profitable due to the high rent, but it is good to see competitor leaving around your store there. I can see the i.t shop in IN's square is a place for people to stay and wait. Sales packaging coming out from the i.t shop is especially eye-catching because the shops around are usually too cheap.

I have noticed that I.T. group has performed better in higher-class malls e.g. Festival Walk and Shatin. It is out of my expectation too. I am going to figure it out in the future. That's very important as I.T is going to open more shops in premium locations.

My style of value investing:

The three general principles of value investing are
1 Analys business operation from the view of business owner
2 Focus on value of business instead of stock price
3 Invest with adequate margin of safety

Based on the general principles, my style has ten features:
1 Integrity is a must
2 I am only interested in companies having sustainable competitive advantages, e.g. special business model, brand value and good industry and position, or extra-ordinary management.
3 I only appreciate growth business(long term sales growth).
4 I am only interested in business that I understand.
5 I am especially interested in excellent business in their bad time.
6 I especially focus on industry and product ecology, psychological business practice, quality of growth, quality of competitive advantages and operational efficiency.
7 I never hold more than three stocks
8 I will fully invest if I have idea
9 I never time the market
10 I only cut loss on fundamental mistakes.

Letter to the chief strategy officer of Chen Hsong:

Dear Stephen,

If you are busy, please read the last paragraph.

I am the investor you meet in the result annoucement. I mention about
Toyota Production System today. I write to recommend the adoption of
Toyota Production System(TPS) to massively improve the production
efficiency and flexibility of Chen Hsong. I have spent a lot of time
on studying Toyota and how the TPS is invented and how it works and
how to adopt it in other buisness operation. I write this e-mail is
merely personal not for any business incentive.

Perhaps you have already known what I am about to tell you. But if you
find some of my points infeasiable at this moment, please try not to
disagree with it first. think if the Toyota Production System can
massively increase Chen Hsong competitive advantage, like doubling the
margin, doubling sales, lowing the inventory to 20-30days, improving
quality and techonology of the products, double the vareity of
products, it is worthwhie to study how to break the infeasibility. Do
you agree? Anyway, let's me start.

What is TPS?
TPS is a completely different production philosophy to the Ford or
mass production system. It is not just Just-in-time produciton.
Just-in-time is the feature of TPS, but not equal to TPS. To achieve
JIT, it is important to have a lot of unconventional operational
arrangement. So if JIT seems infeasible now, please consider how to
achieve JIT first. The goal of TPS is to achieve mass-customization
economically by eliminating the waste between each process of
production.

Benefit of TPS:
The industry of plastic molding machine is a turbulent one. The demand
is unpredictable, technology requirement is high. Price is sensitive.
Production lead time is long. Inventory is high. Machine model is
diverse. It is very similiar to the situation of the Toyota in 1950s.
Toyota used about 15 years to invent and improve the production so
that it can
1 mass customize its product economically
2 Improve the quality of products continuously
3 Decrease working capital ratio by 10times or more
4 Decrease the R&D and production lead time by >75%
5 Increase the innovation and production efficiency
6 Produce product accroding to the order just-in-time and economically
without
1 Treating its suppliers badly
2 Big capital investment on the new system or expensive machinery
3 Concentrating on several models to cut cost

How to change from massive production to TPS:
1 Quick setup changeover to make production leveling
Firstly, reduce the time for die setup to single minutes. It may seems
impossible. But Toyota has decrease the time massive, e.g. from 6hours
to 3 minutes. There are many books about it. It does takes time and
employees to improve it. But the expenditure is low
2 Production leveling to stabilize production flutuation
Conventionally, if you are product 100 pieces of product A, B and C.
You will produce all A, then all B and then all C such that you can
achieve economic of scale. Product leveling means to produce ABC then
ABC and then ABC. It's goal is to minimize the raw material required
in the process. E.g. if you are making A, you are preparing the
inventory of B and C. The inventory required will be 1A1B1C instead of
all A, all B and all C
3 Rearrange the floor plan to cell production units
If there is 10 processes, conventional the shopfloor is breakdown into
10 areas to mass operate in order to achieve economic of scale of
management and in-house transportation. In TPS, the 10 process is
placed together like a U-shaped cell. The shopfloor then is consist of
a lot of cells which indivdiually contain the 10 processes. It aims to
eliminate the inventory, between each process and massive decrease the
total production time. There are more benefits than that, let me skip
them first
4 Replace the planned production schedule to demand-pull production scheduling.
Because the production time is largely reduced, product can be made
and shipped quickly. It is especially important when the demand is
uncertain. You don't plan the production schedule. The whole system
only produce when there is an order. I think you know how it works
out. It aims to largely reduced the the hidden cost associated by
overproduced inventory.

How product is made in the TPS:
1 Different orders are received
2 Production leveling
3a The end assembly line start to use the inventory produce the machine
3b Order the upper component unit/supplier to produce inventory
3c The production is shipped to the customer continuous(as the system
produce continuously instead of in a big batch size)
4 The pull-production system extend up the supply chain to fill the
used inventory

Conclusion:
It is difficult for me to explain the TPS in brief in e-mail, the
skill and technique required is much more than I can write. I hope I
can introduce the TPS to Chen Hsong in person. I hope China production
can gain global competitive advantages and I believe an advanced and
efficient production system is essential for sustainable growth. I
think Chen Hsong has a big potential to adopt the TPS and achieve
extraordinary performance and you are the key person to the
realization. Please write me back if you are interested to continue
our conversation. You can direct me to operation dept or shopfloor
manager instead of replying me in person. Thank you for your
attention.

Regards,
Franky

Reply from the Chief Strategy Officer of Chen Hsong:

Dear Franky,

Thank you so much for your info.

We ourselves also studied TPS very very carefully (or its latest
incarnation: LEAN manufacturing). Our Dr. Chiang Chen is an avid admirer of
Toyota and its production systems and has been trying to introduce the same
to Chen Hsong starting over ten years ago. We've had mixed successes.

All in all, we found that TPS depends on a smooth flow of materials and
information through the pipeline with no hickups and in a line-balanced
form. To a certain extent, this is what happens internally in Chen Hsong
plants, where anything is made only when necessary. However, we also found
that, without participation of external suppliers who are willing to supply
in small batches and on a continuous manner, it is more difficult to sure
smooth flow of purchased components, and line stalls become frequent due to
stock-outs. We suffered this about three/four years ago due to an
aggressive streamlining project, when the market suddenly took an upturn
with very little forewarning.

We always welcome your ideas and your enthusiasm. You're welcome to visit
us in our plants and discuss with our manufacturing personnel to share ideas
further. You'll probably find that, in the operating environment in China
today, more of a compromise must be taken to buffer out irregularities on
the supply side, which is MUCH less reliable than Japanese suppliers.

Cheers,

Letter to the Chief Strategy Officer of Chen Hsong (2):

Dear Stephen,

I am so delighted that Dr. Chiang Chen support the idea. Let me talk
more about how the TPS is adopted in Toyota.

In Toyota, Taiichi Ohio's idea is first rejected by everyone except
for Eiji Toyoda. He first applied the idea in his own production unit.
His success then gain him more power in his toyota and then he spread
the TPS all over Toyota. He mentioned that JIT supply is essential.
But how to achieve that? In his book, <>, he
mentioned that it is necessary to invite the supplier to its toyota to
watch and study the TPS. Toyota start to do it early. Toyota even sent
engineers to its supplier to guide them using TPS. He said, because of
the superior efficiency, suppliers are usually interested. The change
of supplier takes time, but it does gain toyota huge operational
efficiency in the future. Automobile is consist of over 20k numbers of
components while the TPS is feasible there. I think TPS is also
feasible in Chen Hsong.

In the beginning, I think Chen Hsong can remain the purchasing of raw
material. So the inventory for raw material remains high. Then Chen
Hsong itself use the TPS in its production so that the inventory of
work-in-process and finished goods is largely reduced. It can be done
without the participation of suppliers. Then Chen Hsong can try to
invite the suppliers to learn the system. Chen Hsong should send them
engineer to help them. Now, Chen Hsong is the leader in the market and
is doing better and better, I think it is a good opportunity to
influence the suppiers and show industry leadership.

"Buyer credit" and "more inventory" are feasible strategies in the
turbulent market. However, what if the competitors try to copy the
strategies? I think Chen Hsong can still perform better then the
others, but competitiveness of the industry will increase, giving the
whole industry a low return on investment. I think the strategy can
give Chen Hsong temporary success. Improving the operational
efficiency is the key to long term success.

The TPS requires a numbers of critical operational arranagement e.g.
one-piece flow, quick changeover, production-leveling, multi-tasked
labour, pull-production scheduling(Kanban), stardardization of
operation, Kaizen culture etc. Without one of them, the adoption of
TPS will be likely to fail.

I am highly interested to visit the plants and discuss with the
manufacturing pensonel of Chen Hsong. I think TPS can be adopted
within Chen Hsong first. I believe some improvement can be done.
Please arragement for visit for me in your convenience. I will be
always available for the visit. Let's keep in touch. Thanks!

Cheers,
Franky

Opinion deviation of Solomon Systech:

I am deligthed to see the large opinion deviation among those iBanks. They have proven my proposition in the beginning of 2005 that 2878 will have the highest uncertainty in the 05H2.

Merill Lynch $4.7
Mongan Stanlen: $2.8
UBS: $2
DBS: $3.3

Regarding the UBS report, I think the analyst is ignorant on the reason of ASP decline. Actually, the ASP drops 20-30% recent year is because of the rise of low-cost individual
IC designers, especially Solomon Systech. Also, the drop in foundry give the low-cost individaul IC designer to low price to gain market share from the IDM. If foundry cost keep stable, ASP can't drop much. Also, the ASP won't drop so fast as the individual designer has already had lowered the price to gain market share. Unless there is another lower-cost model, the price can't drop in such a rate. Large panel IC is a good example.

四隻異動股:偉易達,新確,萬裕,騰訊
1偉易達
高開7%,低收8%。業績在預期之內,而vsmile能否維持還是 未知之數,如可支持現價呢~我以為人們會在好消息後出貨,但竟然最高做$32,差不多是之前話要沽空佢既位置。

2新確科技
升13%。不知原因。然而,vtech的業績顯示其電訊產品在歐洲 市佔率達10%,預期未來會有更多後進市場者進入歐洲市場,對新確有威協,理論上新確應有難才對。唔通d人用同業比較?如果係既話,真係另一個Man- with-a-hammer syndrome了。

3萬裕國際
最多跌30%。一日跌咁多的股票真少見。之前講過這公司的盈利能力 難以明白,負現金流,低派息比率,股價突然爆升,經紀推廌,投機朋友大舉買入,投資朋友沒有興趣,google裡沒有相關資料,電子業朋友未曾聽過等等的 因素。Leon曾說笑,當散戶沖入去買時,再跌一半就差不多停了。看看他的笑話準不準吧~今日894才有人出黎入,那894的目標價便是$0.9了。

4騰訊
這公司正慢慢吸引我的注意力...

十字路上的晶門:

中小尺寸面板業已經在05下半年正式進入TFT的換代潮。 05Q3,台灣的TFT出貨量QoQ增長達100%。作為最大的小面板生產商的勝華,第四季也正式投產自制的TFT面板。隨著韓、台的大面廠將五代以下廠 轉為小面板的產能,TFT的價格已在05年頭開始下跌。本來由日本商廠獨佔的中小尺寸TFT面板市場的局面,將會在05年下半年產生劇變。

對晶門而言,TFT換代可提高TFT IC的銷量。然而,TFT IC行業跟CSTN不完全相同。台灣最大的小尺寸TFT面板廠為友達、奇美電及統寶,而CSTN則為勝華。TFT產業的公司跟晶門的關係是遠不及CSTN 產業。友達與奇美電都有自己的直屬IC設計廠。即使手機品牌可以決定IC,但有部份的IC使用權還是在面板廠手中。即是說,晶門有機會會失去在CSTN產 業中的關係優勢。

CSTN在03開始放量,04年倍增,04年平均也在$2美元。今 年,TFT才剛放量,IC價格價格已跌破$2。TFT的產業競爭是比CSTN還大的,而這將引致TFT IC產業的價格下跌幅度比以前CSTN產品週期為大。

晶門將要面對的TFT換代潮,好處是晶門有機會在TFT產業中延續 顯示技術的優勢,繼續佔領市場重大的份額,但同時將要面對改變了的市場關係及更大幅度的價格下跌。晶門的市場份額上升,出貨量上升將抵消價格下跌對銷售額 的影響。即使毛利可以由成本下跌來維持,但究竟下一步,晶門怎樣維持其在小尺寸面板的規模呢?OLED面板能為成為繼TFT之後的手機面板主流還是個疑 問,但OLED面板IC價格已跌至$2.5水平。兩年後的OLED價格,究竟會跌至什麼的地步呢?

三星表示會如大面板市場一樣,06年在中小尺寸面板中稱霸。相信中 小尺寸面板將會面對更大的壓力。然而,中小尺寸隨著這改變,有機會由日本導向,轉為完全非日本導向。如是者,非日本市場便會倍增。即使小尺寸面板價格急 跌,晶門在小尺寸面板的潛力還是很大,市佔率不斷提升是可以預測的。然而,整體中小尺寸產值下跌或維持,就現在看來是難以逆轉的。我甚至相信。05及06 年可能已是中小尺寸面板產值的高峰期。

晶門05年下半年將踏足大尺寸面板市場。顯然這是晶門的唯一增長出 路。相信中國的位置及與廣達的關係將可容易地帶領晶門進入大面板市場。然而,大面板競爭激烈,技術低,毛利低,而晶門的關係在大廠中不佔優勢。究竟晶門在 能否同樣地獲得如小面板的進展呢?

雖然晶門在這段時間將要面對很大的不明朗因素,但在這之後,增長便 會變得明朗。隨著大面板上軌道,TFT換代成熟,07年開始進人OLED換代,mp3市場大規模化,新型顯示器技術開始成熟,將可為晶門帶來可觀的增長潛 力。然而,短期而言,那些因素是很難確認的。

手機品牌在05年開始生產超低價手機,主攻中國、巴西及印度,打機 二手機市場。這使舊有技術如MSTN及低階CSTN也維持出貨量。這因素一方面導致晶門的出貨量及市佔率急升,同時也使舊技術的出貨量不因換代而下跌。另 一因素是Nokia的面板訂單有機會隨著日本TFT失勢而釋出。該訂單對非日本廠的影響力巨大,暫時難以估計其影響的程度及時間表。這些,都將會05年下 半年可以得知。

我大半年前已表示,05下半年是晶門最不明朗的時間,前景能見度極 低。現在,究竟可以如何定價這公司呢?我真想知道。

Serious Mistake on 2878:

Damn it! I forgot to add the net cash in 2878....it is about $0.48 per share. This mistake is so costly!!! I am also doubt about the info of ASP erosion.

However, in the long run, 2878 is still in a difficult position. Samsung which start to produce small panel aggressively is likely to cut price next year. With the unlimited capacity from the older generation of LCD plants, the whole small panel industry is likely to be doomed. At that time, 2878 will face very high pricing pressure then. I expect the marign will decrease in a rate more than expected by 2007. Even the volume increase may offset the effect, I think it is difficult to maintain the sustain the profit. Hopefully, the big panel and OLED driver IC can maintain the growth of 2878. The latter which 2878 has domintate 60% of the global market really has big potential.


I.T.初步投資分析報告:

1業務:
I.T.的主要業績有三:經銷國際品牌,特許國際品牌及自有品牌零 售。

國際品牌業務,主要由I.T.、i.t.、 double park及ETE等品牌零售店構成。它們經銷大量國際品牌,時有替換。店裡沒有自有品牌的成衣,但價錢牌上及購物袋上會印有I.T.、i.t.、 double park及ETE等名稱。店內單一成衣品牌價值與零售店的成功關係不大,零售店只是一個銷售平台,每年都有新的品牌加入及舊的品牌被取消。能夠經銷合潮流 的品牌,增取零售店質量及知名度及網絡協力商,是業務的重要關鍵。大量的品牌數目,豪華的裝潢,廣闊的銷售網及I.T.信用卡,是I.T.暫時的成果。發 展的方向可參考Lane Crawford及Joyce。

特許國際品牌業務,則是由國際品牌授權予I.T.開店,現在主要是 Arnold Palmer, French Collection(FCUK), i.t. loves mickey等。這類業務與國際品牌的分別是,專營店中只銷售該品牌的成衣。即是說,成衣的品牌價值對I.T.會有影響。另外,特許經營權也是有限期的, 或有終止合約,品牌另立銷售點的風險。可是,特許國際品的都是己經成名的品牌,受歡迎程度高,所以品牌換代風險較國際品牌業務中的品牌風險為小。然而, I.T.廣闊的銷售網及豐富的本土零售經驗,都是成為國際品牌與I.T.的繼續合作的條件。近年,特許國際品牌的數目在增長中。

自有品牌業務,主要由izzue、b+ab及5cm組成。成衣設計 由I.T.負責,並由第三方廠房生產,所以沒有建廠房的需要。這些業務的品牌價值對業務的影響重大。因為是自有品牌的關係,毛利較高,但推廣開支也較大。 業務增長可有推廣的規模經濟。近年自有品牌業務提升,便是導致I.T.利潤率提高的主要原因。i.t. loves mickey、puzzle及fingercroxx也是自創品牌,在國際品牌經銷店中銷售,有機會成為未來的新增的自有品牌業務動力。

I.T.在香港及中國的銷售面積,由2003年至今的發展大概如 下:
2002年  :142953(呎)
2003年  :147223
2004上半年:147223
2004下半年:171057
2005上半年:220000+78600(中國)
2005下半年:257000
2006上半年:294000+167000(中國)
(注意:數字由本人搜集,或有誤差)

2市場及其特徵:
成衣零售業是B2C業務,顧客需求多元化,市場多元化,產品與服務 質量並重,消費經驗對影響產品價值影響大,品牌推廣重要。市場容量大,在不同的segment可容立多個品牌。

I.T.的經銷及特許品牌業務主要集中在高中檔次,而自有品牌也集 中在中檔次。各特許品牌及自有品牌都有自己的檔次或品牌牌形象,針對不同的顧客群。

另外,市場具有地區性及季節性特徵。

銷售點的地點對零售業十分重要。不同地區的店鋪會有不同的銷售表現 及功能。在高級的地段開店可增加店鋪的品牌形象;在人流多的地點開店可提高獲利;在商場的店舖的收入會較穩定;在遊客區的店舖可受惠於旅遊業,及提高零售 店的國際知名度。要注意的是,店鋪位置不是完全自由競爭的。合約及搬遷成本等都影響著店鋪的轉移。管理店鋪地理位置的能力是決定零售業成敗的關鍵因素。

I.T. 的產品大概可分為兩季,即春/夏及秋/冬。前者衣料較少,單價較低;後者則衣料較多,單價較高。另外,冬季重要節日較多,如聖誔節及新年,都使秋/冬季的 銷售額會比春/夏季的銷售額為高。這會使店鋪在兩季的銷售表現及效率有很大的差距。


3經營策略:
I.T.混合國際及自有品牌的銷售方法是有效創造自有品牌的方法。 I.T.的國際品牌及自有品牌銷售額比例大概為1:1。後者從1999年開始,銷售比例一直上升,而且品牌數目正在增加,主要是由於I.T.可藉國際經銷 業務來吸取市場及設計經驗。在國際品牌經銷店售賣自有品牌,可以提高自有品牌形象,減低創立品牌的風險。

I.T.運用店中店策略,可減低租金及增加人流量。店中店即店鋪中 有多個品牌的銷售專櫃。通常店中店的面積很大,而且自成一角,可租獲得租金上的優惠。

I.T.除了在其下的品牌經銷店中銷售品牌成衣外,還會以單獨銷售 店經營較受歡迎的品牌。通常品牌經銷店會有較大的購物優惠,所以毛利較低,只有50%左右。單獨銷售店折扣較少,但款色較多,而且是專屬該品牌的銷售經 驗,所以毛利較高,達60%以上。

銷售網絡決定經銷業務的競爭力,所以I.T.近年積極開店,上市後 更開始於香港黃金地段開店。相信這有助提升I.T.旗下的品牌形象及爭取經營權的競爭力,但同時也會增加租金成本及銷售效益。效益下降將在短旗內反映在財 務狀況上。

經銷店及自有品牌推廣方面,主要靠廣告,尤以雜誌為重。同時與 Citibank辦信用卡及在店內實行會員制,提高顧客忠誠。

4競爭與發展:
I.T.的品牌偏於中高檔,所以競爭會以品牌形象,消費體驗及產品 質量競爭,多於價格競爭。價格只是決定目標顧客的一個指標。

基於市場容量大,所以市場上在不同的檔次也有若干的競爭對手。潮流 可以隨時間而改變,但品牌價值經過時間建立後,除非犯下嚴重的錯誤,否則一般品牌價值可以廷續。國際品牌數知名度低,但數量多,可以減低品牌換代的影響。 自有品牌經過多年的建立,才轉為單獨經營店,有一定知名度。維持品質及宣傳,便可以在市場上立足。我不預期個別品牌會增長可觀。我認為新增自有品牌是未來 自有品牌業務的增長動力。

在香港,漸漸出現了抄襲I.T.模式的競爭對手,如2%集團, Dmop及K-2等。它們的產品檔次、定價及形象都跟I.T.的自有品牌類似。I.T.的自有品牌暫時有市場認知、銷售網(地點)及推廣規模經濟等優勢。 我認為,I.T.上市後,加快在黃金地段開店,以增加集團的品牌價值,是應對競爭對手的一種方法。然而,未來競爭環境的改變,暫時還言之上早,未等待未來 業績加以證實。不能排除自有品牌有衰落的可能,但同時,我認為中檔品牌消費者變化較慢,而且競爭者數目並不是十分多,在暫時擁有競爭優勢的情況下,我們可 以在未來自有品牌的發展開始衰落時才開始質疑自有品牌的競爭力。

在內地,同類檔次產品少,但市場消費力不如香港。相信現在積極拓展 中國業務,在黃金地段開設旗艦店將可為I.T.建立品牌價值,是I.T.長遠發展的重要因素。旭日管理層預期業務三年內收支平均,但近日發表言論,表示有 可能在今年(第二年)收支平均。近日06上半年業績印證了該情況,店舖面積比上年同期增長近倍,虧損由六百萬減少至二百萬。預期未來中國業務可成為 I.T.的盈利增長動力。

5獲利能力分析:
I.T.的成本結構主要分為:成衣成本、人工、租金、裝潢、推廣開 支、利息、稅項及匯率改變。

I.T.售賣中高檔成衣,所以毛利一般在五成以上。決定成本的因素 包括材料、折扣及存貨撥備。材料成本變化不大,但自有品牌業務材料成本較低,該業務比重的改變會影響材料成本比例。折扣的程度受銷售預測能力及推廣優惠影 響。獨立品牌店的增加將可減少折扣帶來的毛利壓力。然而,品牌數量增加同時也增加了存貨的數量,提高了銷售預測的難度。折扣銷售後的存貨,將要為此作出撥 備。I.T.經營歷史中,沒有作出過重大的存貨撥備,近年更有些存貨可銷售掉,所以有回撥盈利。然而,這是獲利能力的關鍵,未來需要繼續觀容I.T.在此 項目上的能力。如果爆發禽流感,消費意欲突然下降,有機會短期內威脅毛利。然而,隨著事件冷卻及銷售預測調整,影響將大幅降低,所以影響只會屬於短期。

人工增長會慢於經濟改變。03年香港經濟開始回升,I.T.的人工 成本也上升。同時,消費意欲也隨著經濟回升而增加。在04及05年,暫時影響屬正面。然而,如果經濟突然轉壞,同時人工不能立刻縮減,將為I.T.的獲利 能力帶來壓力。另外,新店數目比例增高,平均員工效率將下降,人工成本將上升。06上半年,新店增長數目近30%,會有一定影響。I.T.在下半年不會積 極開店,相信員工效率會漸漸提升,這因素導致的人工成本壓力將緩解。

租金在街鋪及商場舖有不同的改變。街鋪多為獨立業主,租金改變由店 主決定。在旅遊區,不理性的業主或會大幅提升租金,大幅影響店鋪的獲利能力。商場舖通常由商場統一管理,業主會考慮雙方長遠的合作關係及店舖對商場的影響 力,所以租金變動傾向理性。另外,商場也會採用銷售額掛鈎租金,即以固定租金或銷售額的某百份比,兩者為高者作為租高,後者高於固定租金的部份稱為或然租 金。隨著經濟回升,很多商場舖已在繳交或然租金。因此,今年商場舖的租金增長會比街舖的增幅隱定。另外,租約多是兩年或以上的,每年只會有一部份的店舖需 要續租,所以今年租金上升不會完全反影在即期業績上。然而,租金與人工一樣,慢於經濟而改變,所以經濟突然變差將對成本帶來壓力。租金是固定成本,銷售額 越高,租金的比例便下降。因此,同店銷售額增長便是店舖獲利能力的重要指標。要注意的是,跟員工一樣,新增店舖的效率(人們的認知程度)也需要時間來提 升。同店銷售增長會受天氣、流感及經濟等外在因素影響,同時也受品牌價值、產品吸引力及新店比例等影響。

裝潢是一可控制的,有彈性的固定成本。裝潢可提高I.T.的品牌價 值,帶給消費者更好的消費體驗,是跟對手競爭的因素之一。這開支由I.T.自行決定,所以具有彈性。同時,因為這支出不會跟隨銷售額上升,所以是固定成 本。會計上,裝橫開支會被資本化,再每年折舊。因此,新店比例提升會傾向增加這支出的成本比例。

推廣開支也是固定成本,但與租金與裝潢不同的是,這支出不會跟隨店 舖的數目而上升。因此,隨著I.T.集團的增長,推廣將可獲得規模經濟。如集團維持該支出比例,將有助I.T.加快拉遠與競爭對手的差距。

利息開支跟息率及負債有關。上市後,I.T.己經償還所有債務,該 支出應會大幅減少。I.T.現金充足,中國業務收支平均,預期利息開支壓力很微。

稅務由政府決定,傾向穩定。

I.T.的成衣主要從外國及中國採購及生產。人民幣升值或美元貶值 會對I.T.帶來壓力。今年開始,集團己進行匯率對沖。匯率的影響未來將會輕微。然而,在會計上,則會影響毛利及匯率盈虧的數字。

6財務分析:
I.T.在06年上半年,手頭現金4億,無負債。經營現金流 51m,資本開支33m,現金流足以支付資本開支,另外集團墊支 20m給旭日宜泰(中國業務)。我預期下半年新增店數減少、旺季效應及中國業務營運改善,將為I.T.帶來全年的正現金流。集團計劃未來兩三年在香港每年 增加4萬呎銷售面積,資本開支應該與今年相若。我預期未來沒有融資壓力。

中國業務還在創業階段,需要營運資金支持增長,所以近年應收債款正 在提高。相信中國業務成熟後,情況會大幅改善。存貨方面,近年受新店比例提升的影響,不斷提升。隨著本港開店高峰期過後,我預期情況會改善。另外,存貨也 受行業季節性影響,應當留意。如果以上兩個因素改善,將可提高集團的現金流。

集團只派末期息,派息比例為40%。05年派息4仙。

8風險:
以上文中提及過多個影響I.T.的風險,在此作一總結,之後作少許 補充。

特許品牌終止合約、經濟轉差、自有品牌被競爭對手商品化、中國業務 失敗、租金增長加快、突發事件(如禽流感及天氣),皆構成I.T.的經營風險。對於這些風險,我建議要審慎考慮對風險的可能性、影響的時間及程度。

然而,我想強調,I.T.上市時期短,管理層質量未被時間證實,或 有誠信風險。在上市前,管理層曾向股東190股息,減少公司的現金值以獲得更高的上市定價。從2003年開始,公司曾多次向管理層發可換股債券,04年行 使所有可換股債券,以$0.4獲得上市前公司股權若10%的權益。另外,上市前,公司擁有應收董事債款。雖然現在I.T.己沒有可換股債券及應收董事債 項,而且現金充足,但誠信還是要經過時間來證明。

9盈利預測及定價:
公司手頭淨現金4億,結合之前的財務及經營分析,現金流傾向改善。 假設公司中國業務沒有盈利與現金貢獻,公司增長與競爭及成本上漲抵消,導致未來只有低增長。今年上半年盈利(扣除新會計制度之影響)比去年同期增長 32%,達43m。預期下半年新店比例下降有助營運效率改善,保守估計同店增長0%,中國業務收支平均。經營面積比同期期增加16%,但人工及租金仍比上 年同期為高,預期利潤率維持(上半年因天氣及租金急升,利潤率還可保持),下半年盈利將達 92m。全年達136m(如採用新會計準則,盈利為123m),較去年增長21%(10%)。

本土地區低增長公司,中國業務有機會帶來高增長加上本土競爭及經濟 變差風險,我暫會把I.T.分類為低增長公司,未來”經濟盈利”比率10倍定價(無增長之DCF定價,10%discount)。價值為1.74b。現市 值較價值折讓40.8%折讓。

分析員:Franky Fan
日期:2005年11月12日
網址:http: //ihome.cuhk.edu.hk/~s027639
電郵:simplythere@gmail.com
ICQ:105972209
(如要轉載,請也貼上以上資料。唔該!)

2005年10月

賣掉晶門:

上星期,我賣掉所有晶門,吸納零售與酒店股。

賣掉晶門真是一件不容易的事,始終公司是我喜歡的模型,自己放了那 麼多時間去研究,抱了半年多,也讓我賺進不少,而且股價還在上升中,在這階段賣掉,真是有點壓力。可是,抱著晶門的這段期間,不少工業、零售與酒店股也下 跌了很多,也有不少做得不錯的。至於晶門,下半年其實我並不看好,我相信這次將會出現第一次沒有earning surprise的業績,而過渡憧憬業績的人更會對業績感到失望。這其實也是因為晶門的產品與行業特性呢~

短談毅力工業:


1主要產品市場CD, CD+mp3 Discman被mp3機市場快速蠶食中。
2供應商IC出問題,mp3機出貨延遲,轉型失敗。Apple強勁 的產品&定價使市場難以切入。低檔mp3有被手機取代的危機。
3Portable DVD player發展慢,規模不及競爭對手。
3產品檔次低,塑膠原料成本比例大,受其價格影響大
4聽說公司的研發能力在行業中聲譽不好,換代與創新能力受懷疑
5新廠剛落成而遇上轉型失敗,營運風險增加
6轉型失敗使存貨積壓,投資加大,負債上升,營運風險增加

公司在轉型關鍵時期,在生死存亡之際,風險無比。我認為要等待轉型 事宜明朗化才可以考慮。

短談I.T:


相關品關:I.T., i.t. izzue, b+ab, 5cm, double park, ETE, i.t. loves Mickey, Arnold Palmer, FCUK
Key Market Nature:
1 Some customer like to stick to certain brand, while some like to try the latest foreign brand.
2 Customer is less price sensitive but quality(style, fashion) sensitive to the products. Inventory risk is not large because bargain sales can attract large numbers of customer.
3 Suppliers like to franchise to big sales channel while it will still open its own shops
4 Rental cost is the key to the operational cost
Key Strategies.
1 Board brand portfiolio to target segmented local fashion market
2 Use imported brands to breed own brands with time. Low cost and low risk development of brand.
3 Shops crowded together to lower the rental cost and increase sales.
4 Branded sales channel attracts customers and suppliers. Ecoinnomic of scale can leverage both by stronger marketing.
5 Change of taste will always happen in product level but not product platform level. Change of brand in I.T. is frequent to cope with the change of taste.
Key Risk:
1 Short history after listed. Management quality is unknown
2 Rental industry has very high bargaining power in HK
3 Competitors like F.C.K is copying the strategy of I.T.
4 The development of I.T. in China is still in loss.
5 I.T. still fail to register the "I.T.", "i.t." in China

短談蒙牛:


1 It is not much affected by economy downturn. Rise of living standard will
increase milk consumption. I expect it to grow faster than the economy in
the long rum.
2 The market is consolidating, so you can see price war. However, with the
growth of the market, milk source become the constrait of price war. Small
companies can't compete and fail. now, Eli has .6m cow and 2319 has .3m cow,
for the others3rd and 4th largest firm, only .1. I believe there may be one
more price war in the future to complete the consolidation
3 Milk source is important for production price. Eli and 2319 has large milk
source in 蒙古 which give them $.2-.3 cost advantages.
4 Marketing is important for consumer goods. The scale of 2319 can give it
the economic of scale. Marketing is essential during the consolidating.
Currently, many local market exist some big milk firms. Marketing can
leverage them.
5Consumer's change of taste will happen in product level, but change of
taste of product platform is slow. The product-sea strategy of 2319 is quite
a good move.
6 Fresh milk is only one of the product segment of the 乳品industry. 2319
can extend with their brand in Fresh milk. e.g. Sour Milk, high-class milk,
milk powder(currently dominated by eli and foreign brand)

but
1 Marketing exp will increase largely to expand the product platform.
2 Product-sea strategy increase the operational cost.
3 Capex is large to grab enough milk source
4 Consolidating period may last a long term, keeping the whole industry is
relative low margin
5 Consumer confidence risk, just like 光明's poor quality product

久違了的公司研究:


很久也沒有看公司了~一直抱住晶門,使發掘公司的意欲大減,反而集 中研究它的incentive反而增加,不知這是否一件好事~不過近日股市跌左唔少,好多股票從年中已經跌左不少,尤其係d零售股。另外,朋友投資也幅度 上升,手上多了現金,又開始對研究公司產生強大的incentive,近日我每日都看四小時以上呢,而且精中力高,感覺很不錯~

近日得知原來我有些朋友也買了晶門,有些賺了,有些蝕了。這公司變 化得很快,現在說的,明天就會過時,公司會變,評論也會要變了。所以,還是Philip Fisher的主張來得有道理:投資,一係親自操刀研究,一係就交給別人打理,否則遲早便有機會出事了。

先排閱讀了一些有趣的股票效應:在股市旺時,很多人會向別人推介股 票,為什麼呢?原因一來是”大佬心態”,當係關照兄弟,二來係因為自己已經入夠貨,股價未必,一來想朋友加入,增加信心,二來也可以幫助推高股價。因此, 當很多人向你推介股票時,你便要小心了~這個效應一早就聽過,但背後的原理,還是第一次聽,挺有新意。

十月好書推介:


1 Evolutionary Psychology: The New Science of the Mind
-這個題目十分重要!但全球暫還未收到正規教育課程。要學,便要靠 自己了!
2 The Power Laws
-Mungerism的產品吧!介紹不同學科在商業的應用,只有 biology寫得好,其他都shit。而Biology部份,是抄Self-gene同埋下面那本Nature of Economies
3 The Nature of Economies
-最大的問題係以對話形式寫成,難以閱讀。

晶門05Q3評論:


台灣TFT出貨量QoQ增長100%,十分驚人。相信是因為友達及 勝華等大廠開始量產中小TFT面板之故。我相信今年全年台灣TFT出貨會超過30m。大量TFT廠加入中小尺寸面板的生意意味著TFT的換代潮開始踏入高 峰期。

其實早在04年上半年人們已預期TFT的來臨。然而CSTN的大幅 降價,台灣不成熟的中小TFT產業鏈及低價手機對低價模組的需求,都延遲了TFT的換代。

主要台灣的競爭對手有矽創及聯詠,前者說CSTN第三季有機會出貨 高達5m,而聯詠也表明8月已達成1m月出貨量。矽創因良率低及品質有問題,延遲了 TFT的出貨,然而與友達的joint-venture矽達,的確給了矽創很好的出貨機會。最後是否能大量出貨,要視乎良率、品質及規模經濟了,暫時還不 見矽創有突出的表現。

聯詠是台灣最大的大尺寸TFT驅動IC設計廠,晶片出貨量巨大,與 聯電及友達十分有關係,也有很強的研發隊伍,是晶門的未來主要競爭對手之一。CSTN及 TFT月出貨1m,暫時還很少,但聯詠先天的供應鏈關係及規模經濟給予它很大的價格戰實力。根據聯據所說,未來還會繼續利用價格來吸引客人。相信未來 CSTN與TFT驅動IC將持續面對比較大的降價壓力。

LeadisQ3維持低迷,預期Q4反彈。此競爭對手客源單一,資 源有限,欠供應鏈優勢、稅率優勢,顯響力有限。

E-paper在EInk、Sony及Philip等大廠推動下, 技術發展迅速,或可在五年內普及。然而,供應鏈應會保留在日本之內,對日本以外廠商而言,獲利或要再等一段時間了。

OLED產業發展良好,AMOLED06年應可開始量產,07- 08年普及,有機會可承接TFT的產品週期,保持顯示器產業整體產值。我預期今年OLED有100%-120%的增長。

晶門上半年年報表示手頭訂單80m,相信下半年的出貨量增長將十分 驚人。TFT換代及新型CSTN有助ASP及晶圓代工成本壓力。唯上年同期ASP高達$2.1,今年跌幅將十分大。暫時我相信業績會在60%以內。

短談太平洋恩利:


基礎:
-強勁的國際競爭力
-強勁的本地競爭力
-專業知識與關係,規模經濟,競爭門檻高
-上游壓力小,有成本轉嫁能力
-合理的購併邏輯
-循序漸進的產品發展策略
現在處境:
-高負債比率與加息成為市場憂慮點
-行業本質性低營運週轉率所造成的利息成本蝕食利率增長
-低毛利的高增長造成的現金流滯後導致公司對營運資金的大量需求
-高增長造成的產能不足造成資本開支增力及毛利率下降
展望:
-新產能開出可提高毛利,相對降低利息成本比例
-資源與關係整頓,可使營資資本回復正常水平
-國際競爭力可使純利率持續上升
-日本渠道管理改善,有機會轉虧為盈
-溫和的擴展及優化管理效率是分析太平洋恩利的重要指標

現價:$1.27

結論:好行業。好公司。很好的投資。

思捷與利豐價格預測:


330, $55.45, it should rise
494, $17.7, it should drop

行業特質:


觀察不同的行業,可發現它們有一些很不同的地方:
1有些行業的ROE只有低個位數字,有些行業的ROE卻能保持高於 20%
2有些行業可容納十個競爭對手,有些只可納立三個
3有些行業的領導公司十年不變,有些則不停改變
4有些行業能持續百年,有些則曇花一現
究竟是什麼原因導致這呢?這對競爭力分析及投資的價值是如何的呢?
(遲些我會談到)

品牌定律:


1不能靠價格建立
2需要時間建立
3差異化:技術主導,設計主導,可用性主導,情感主導,穩定性主 導,服務主導。
4可創造話題,可體驗的品質或心理效果
5心理先於價值先於成本

論品牌等級及其競爭戰略:


Marketing的教科書好像將品牌分開了四個層次。我也把品牌 分了五個等級,不知道它們會否跟Marketing的一樣。我主要用這來分析公司的競爭優勢。
:
1Level One: No brand
-消費者被價格主導消費欲。
-不能在是食品、安全性、醫療及奢侈品中競爭。
-創新的設計、玩意與口味可在差異化市場勝利,而大幅提升形像。
-沒有差異化特質不能賣廣告
2Level Two: Recognized Brand
-消費者被價格與經驗主導消費欲
-可在品牌容量大的市場中生存
-需要加強銷售渠道及維持品質以建立品牌
-標杆同質化及差異化以提升品牌
-明顯複製對手則注定品牌形象維持於此等級。
-細心研究消費者對品牌的認知及其改變
-宜先於次級市場中成長而建立實力
-不宜創造新市場,否則風險很高
-沒有差異化特質不能賣廣告
-宜加強成本控制,投資於技術與設計,準備變革
3Level Three: Biased-functionality Brand
-消費者被Biased-functionality主導,價格次 之。
-在高價食品、安全性,醫療及奢侈品中競爭。
-品質、配套、售後服務、產品海、創新速度及大量客制化為主要競爭 戰略
-供應鏈管理及研發能力導向公司將有優勢,欠之將處於劣勢。
-提升銷售渠道、廣告、創新、配套及服務以提升品牌。
4Level Four: Habitual Brand
-消費者被Consistency Tendency主導,對價格不敏感
-有強勁銷售渠道,合理的功能價格比
-消費品或服務市場
-不能隨便改變Product Platform,但可在Product Platform上持續創新,或建立新的Product Platform
-廣告比產品創新重要,產品應配合marketing而開發
-產品質量要達到合理水平
5Level Five A: Emotional Brand
-消費者被眾多心理因素主導,對價格毫不敏感。
-功能難以客觀比較,功能價格比一致性不明顯。
-與公司定位、廣告、人物、行為、創新及歷史有關。
-產品傾向小量或客制化
-產品為設計及創新主導
-宜與低檔品及競爭對手差異化
6Level Five B: Lock-in Brand
-消費者被Shifting-cost&consistency Tendency主導,對價格不敏感
-Bundling Strategy
-Embrace&Extend Strategy
-Usability stardard
-宜持續加強Usability
-注著協力者關係及變化
-宜Kaisen,不宜Revolution
-留意對手的compatibility,阻止它們達到 Critical Mass
-留意客戶對產品的意見及情緒

有Brand Name不一定有品牌價值。很多品牌都一文不值,例如很多大陸品牌,只懂抄別人,先天注定不能有很高的品牌價值。高科技消費產品有很多大品牌,如 Sony&Sharp等,但不一定是Level 4的,主要是因為產品競爭方法傾向理性,價格高昂,男性消費者多,功能比較容易等。可口可樂,蘋果電腦,Esprit,LV等品牌則不同,它們主要有情感 化設計與廣告,創新,功能難以比較,及其他心理因素所支持。


短談理文造紙

1管理層是誠實的
2行業:紙品需求增長大,要依賴入口,紙品價格不斷上升(紙漿價也 升)
3競爭:國內對手不停擴產,以滿足需求,投資力度很大
4理文優勢:管理優良,產品差異化&集中
5未來:即使行業增長速度維持,供需缺口必因內地競爭而縮小,始後 競爭模式將轉向成本導向,這對理文而言,行業競爭加劇是不利因素,但這些環境更能突出理文管理優良的優勢。然而,在競爭激烈環境中的資本密集型企業,通常 即使有良好的管理,也很難有令人滿意的回報。
6定價:我認為理文未來需要維持資本開始去維持成長,而在未來,更 需投資來維持競爭力。資金壓力對理文而言,將會越趨緊張。即使現在的盈利是高增長,我們也應該十分小心。我建議用投資回報去考慮其增長。另外,也要分辦量 與價格變化的影響。在未來,理文將很難從價格成長中得到盈利增長,那因素應慢慢減少。
7結論:現價$7.7,屬”貼近價值”

2005年9月

物流

1 總括物流
2 物流中心類近零售
3 總量批貨,零售快速補貨
4 一次性JIT,結合供應鏈管理的拉式生產
5 共同配送
6 c to c, b to c,自取貨品,商品寄存
7 批發商收費以批發價,零售商負責物流中心費用

我對企業定價的觀點:


在上年開始,便常有人問我,在那裏可以知道上市公司的價值。之後我 都向他們說明我對公司定價的看法。似乎很多人都對這很有興趣,而或因時間有限,我不能表達清楚我的理論,以致有時會使朋友們感到很不明白。因此,我想藉這 篇文章去談談這個問題。

我們對企業定價,很多時都會用Discount free cashflow model(DCF)去做,我們要輸入預期增長率及貼現率。對於一般企業而言,這是可以接受的方法。然而,經營的情況真的可以有很大差異,不同的經營情況 應會不同的價值。我認為,做定價要出理論出發,但最重要的是結合實際經營來分析。因此,其實公司的價值並不能從什麼地方找倒的,那是一個結合大量資料、分 析、計算、經驗、預期及運氣的結果。無論如何,現在讓我先談談定價的方法:

1基本定價方法:
企業的價值,應相等於未來公司可賺的現金的貼現總和。這個定義適用 於任何企業,高增長企業也不例外。巴菲特也是用DCF Model去計算企業的內在值,貼現率是長期的債券息率,因為這是投資的機會成本。很多人會反對這,因為金融理論認為貼現率應從無風險利率上加上風險因 素。巴菲特用無風險利率的用意,是把定價設為無風險計劃,就如債券一樣。然後,巴菲特再衝量公司的風險,決定對安全邊際的要求。這都是可以從研究巴菲特的 投資方法可以得知的。然而,究竟安全邊際的要求是怎樣決定的,巴菲特只說了,越高風險,安全邊際就應該越高,但並沒有表明實際的做法。

價值投資應是理性的投資,我認為這個安全邊際應該理性地決定。我們 可以從Expected Value的角度出發。我們以預期增長來衝量公司的價值,而公司是否真的能實現那增長,便是其風險所在。除了預期公司應有增長,我認為我們也需要準備一個 增長率最差的情況,再以那數字作定價,得出一個較低的定價,我稱之風險價值。內在價值/現價是獲利部份,風險價值/現價便是損失部份,相乘後得出的數字, 便是計入風險後的內在價值了。以此為作衝量安全邊際的參考,會是比較有根據的。

2影響定價的因素:
很多人用DCF Model,會預計未來一段時期的增長率大概怎樣,企業最終價值會怎樣。會計書上都是這樣教的。

要知道不同因素對定價的影響,讓我們先考慮以下例子:

市場預期A公司未來四年複式增長0-30
市場預期B公司未來四年複式增長10-20%
市場預期C公司未來四年複式增長15%
三家公司,前途看似差不多,但市場對三家公司的定價便未必一樣了。 這要視乎那三間公司的行業是否被市場看好。如果行業被看好,獲利潛力便會被重視,所以定價會以A>B>C,如果是市場較為保守,定價便會是 C>B>A。然而,人們對損失與獲利的心理意義是不對稱的,人們害怕損失多於貪婪同等的額外獲利,所以我認為不可確定性較低的C公司會有溢 價。

市場預期D公司未來四年複式增長15%,並預期公司可繼續維持增長
市場預期E公司未來四年複式增長15%,並預期公司增長會放緩
市場預期F公司未來四年複式增長15%,並預期公司不會增長
市場預期G公司未來四年複式增長15%,並預期公司會出現倒退
市場預期H公司未來四年複式增長15%,但預期公司未來不可預測性 很高。
雖然五家公司未來都可有可觀的增長,但或因為她們的公司或行業特 質,造成了她們有不同的前景。這時,雖然她們未來可有大致相同的增長,但定價便會有很大的分別了。因為公司短期大致有柤同的增長,所以假設所有公司現在的 本益比都是18。A公司前景跟現在大致相同,在未來將維持這本益比,四年後,如果公司複式增長15%,A公司的股價便也大致可增長一倍。C公司四年後便停 止增長,若市場對無增長公司定價為大致9倍本益比,那即使C公司在這四年每年增長15%,股價也將只會維持原狀。B&D&E公司是那是很常見的,跟C公司 原理一樣,股價增長將不及盈利增長。然而,我們要很小心審察市場是否正確。通常分析員對未來的預測,都要有數據支持,對於遠期的增長潛力,會相對保守,尤 其是高增長的公司,另外,也要看公司是否有財力及管理能力,在未來發展新增長點。如果這些做得比較細緻,或可找到一些好的投資機會。其實,對以上種種公司 都是一樣,我們要了解市場對公司的看法是怎樣,而我們再去了解公司實際上是怎樣,比較之下,便知道是否有投資價值了。不過,這需要大量的精神、時間及技 巧,要做倒這,比較好的方法是,自己投身投資業或找基金代勞。

公司I,市值1000億,預期未來四年複式增長15%
公司J,市值100億,預期未來四年複式增長15%
公司K,市值10億,預期未來四年複式增長15%
三家公司,如果近年增長前景相若,我相信定會將會是J> I>K。I公司盈利差不多67億,增長一倍後,盈利高達134億,再增長一倍是268億。歷史有不少公司可以做到這,但更有很多公司在公司擴大後變 得組織僵化,或其市場變得衰落,產值下降。大公司需要維持高增長,必須靠收購,或進入新市場,這會提高公司的風險。至於K公司,規模細,對產業鏈波動的衝 擊未必可以承受得起,或者競爭者眾,甚至要面對強勁的市場領導者,而且公司資源有限,制度化與資訊系統未必成熟,都一一增加了K公司的經營風險,所以定價 是最低。

總而言之,除了考慮增長之外,還有很多因素需要加入定價模型之內。 以上只是其中一些例子吧了!

3增長及其轉歸:
談到這裏,我想你會有興趣知道怎樣才知道公司的增長會怎樣,而增長 之後又會否繼續增長,其可預測性如何,以下讓我談談不同類型的增長及其轉歸。

l 市場增長
市場增長不是必然的,也不是完全不可預測的。有些分析員會以權威的 數據或產業過去周期去預測市場,之後發表研究報告。我認為前者的做法比較慢,而後者又不可靠了。以手機產業為例,近年來權威機構對手機的全球出貨量每年都 給低估了,有時甚至有超過10%的誤差,而半導體周期又因為供應鏈出現了變化而跟以前不同了。這兩個方法的弱點是其資料不夠緊貼行業及公司變化,啟示性不 足。我認為更好的方法是觀察整個產業鏈的動態。例如知道中國紙漿需求擴大,入口量增加,價格上升,造紙廠毛利下降,那便可預測印刷業的毛利也將要下跌了。 得知造紙廠擴產速度加快,紙漿生產力不足,便可預測在一段時間內,紙製品價格將維持高企。又例如房地產及工業投資過熱時,鋼鐵廠不停增產,便可預測在過餘 投資後的需求下降,將導致鋼鐵需求大減,而增產後的鋼鐵廠只好賤賣成品。又例如, 0.25 -0.35的晶圓代工製程產能使用率因大面板LCD驅動IC大增而,對小面板廠而言,成本將因小面板驅動IC同時被扯高,而承受部份的成本上漲壓力,而面 對需求大增及各廠的增產,毛利將不能避免地下跌等等。

另一方面,我們有些情況要留意行業與產業競爭力擴大。典型的例子是 Intel的” Intel Inside”推廣運動,觸發了人們對電腦性能看法的改變。人們慢慢從留意電腦品牌,改為留意電腦性能,尤其是對微處理器的性能。對電腦品牌廠而言,這是 一個行業結構上的變化,產業利潤率將由電腦品牌廠慢慢向高技術性能類配件轉移。至於產業競爭力的改變,影響更大了。例如資訊科技的進度使便利店行業的競爭 大提升,從而使夕陽的小店都轉換成競爭力媲美大型百貨的連鎖經營便利店。在銷售額/員工及銷售額/面積的比率,服務範圍及密度都勝於大型百貨的條件下,近 年大型百貨在日本都在萎縮中,產業利潤由大型百貨慢慢轉移到連鎖便利店業之上了。行業與類似產業的動態,雖然有時看似毫不相關,但還是要抽時間留意一下。 可喜的是,這些變化都是緩慢的,而且市場對這些轉變更是緩慢。然而,一但群眾發現了改變,定價將會急速出現改變,所以我們還是要十分小心!

壟斷
換代
整合:市場類型
l 擴大市場佔有率
l 降低成本而增長
l 提高價值而增長
l 周期性增長
l 進入新市場
l 收購與合拼
l 壟斷而增長
l 會計制度改變
l 資產折舊性增長
l MBO型增長
l 投資型增長
l 優惠性增長
l 撥備型增長

當財富效應遇上心理學:


財富效應(Wealth Effect),我的意思是人們的富財漲跌對人們的消費意欲分別增加與減少的效應。唔知正規經濟理論有冇這重要的效應,我就把這個效應放在分析宏觀消費的 一個很大因素。香港的樓市與消費意欲是我想用的例子之一。然而,最好還是要結合心理學去解釋。

90年代,地產熾熱,港人的資產值一齊高漲,張三今個月賑面賺了5 萬,李四今個月賑面賺了10萬,大家都像不停賺錢,而大家也不停找到新的投資機會,光景看似還會維持。當初賺了巨款,就會慶功,買一些心頭物去慶祝一番。 然而,當整個社會都習慣了慶祝&駛錢,一方面會形成一種social proof,另一方面持繼的這種行為會成為習慣,多年來的財富效應可改變社會整體的消費習慣。

當97過後,樓市大跌,人們賑面

晶門05年上半年業績評論:


Comments
1CSTN is better than my expectation while TFT is otherwise, likely due to the volumn of cheap handset.
2OLED captures admirable 6x% market share from my calculation.
3Technology shift is healthy and within expectation
4Large panel unlikely to contribute large profit this year while having very great potential.
5Overall, the result is within expectation. 05H2 remains potentially good with relatively large uncertainty. Future price pressure unlikely to be as large as H1.
6Working capital improves impressively, resulting in very strong operating cashflow
7Sales from Japan has an impressive 300% increase, probably coming from the order of MSTN and CSTN.

7-11的消費心理學:


反缺貨
重心理
1換季
2大衣
3機會損失->機會損失 
4競爭不會導致銷售下跌
5夏季關東魚
6試食,海報->宣傳(非單純自助)
7顧客決定合理價格
8正月初一還開業->顧客的方便
9接單生產

權力下放->難吃->下架,即使有sales
高用量顧客多->吃膩->產品多樣化
顧客離開,不是一觸即發,只是之前沒有選擇,無可耐可吧了
賣方理論不能應用於買方市場
換季->新貨到->舊貨促銷
競爭勝負已定->競爭帶來更多銷售額
宣傳力度越大,越突顯現狀與宣傳之間的落羊

同一句說話,要重覆無數次,才能使戈記住
fc會不是問題討論會,而是經驗交流會;問題出現,領導提出正確方 針,就不用開會

商品齊全,鮮度管理,清潔維護,親切服務

買方市場->價值取向->貴價飯團勝於賤價飯團
排除滯銷品
米貴->飯團應升->缺貨->銷量反跌
商圈細->多樣化,變化快
商圈大->可銷定銷量
量小->多樣化
量大->少樣化
轉化現有商品為加盟店

內容

  1. 1 2006年11月
    1. 1.1 股市大跌560點及防守性投資:
  2. 2 2006年9月
    1. 2.1 給住好D的信:
    2. 2.2 我的工作(二):戰略家
    3. 2.3 股災點算:
    4. 2.4 我的工作:商業格價專家
    5. 2.5 Arrogant-Value-Investors-Syndrome:
    6. 2.6 中國REITs會加速投資增長:
  3. 3 2006年8月
    1. 3.1 Questions for Interview with Bauhaus:
    2. 3.2 卡森:
    3. 3.3 The Death of Writing Freedom:
    4. 3.4 2878 may have negative earning surprise because of the negative operational leverage
    5. 3.5 Investing chatting with a friend:
    6. 3.6 筆克遠東:
    7. 3.7 國美研究(一):
  4. 4 2006年7月
    1. 4.1 嘉利國際:
    2. 4.2 What are the factors affecting stock price?
  5. 5 2006年6月
    1. 5.1 Proposal of share buyback of Solomon Systech: (12/6/2006)
    2. 5.2 資訊複雜及業務複雜:
  6. 6 2006年5月
    1. 6.1 I.T Analyst Meeting:
    2. 6.2 見指忘月:
  7. 7 2006年4月
    1. 7.1 可留意的公司:
    2. 7.2 中國金融業展望:
    3. 7.3 投資市場將要調整:Wednesday, April 19, 2006
  8. 8 2006年3月
    1. 8.1 How to evlauate 2878:
    2. 8.2 晶門2005業績預測:
    3. 8.3 剩餘產能:
    4. 8.4 中國因素的樽頸:
  9. 9 2006年2月
    1. 9.1 完美公司:
  10. 10 2006年1月
    1. 10.1 2005投資回顧及來年展望:
    2. 10.2 投機理論的重要性:
    3. 10.3 晶門到達目標價:
    4. 10.4 思捷與利豐價格預測(二):
    5. 10.5 LCD Mania:
    6. 10.6 我的零售經營哲學:
    7. 10.7 理論上的經濟周期:
  11. 11 2005年12月
    1. 11.1 Watching Retailers (4):
    2. 11.2 我的投資成績表:
    3. 11.3 <<Fashion Brand>>:
    4. 11.4 一股投資法:
    5. 11.5 Process of Analysis:
  12. 12 2005年11月
    1. 12.1 My view on the management of I.T:
    2. 12.2 自己出現在Fool.com
    3. 12.3 My Quotes about risk and sales of stocks:
    4. 12.4 Watching retailers:
    5. 12.5 Watching Retailers (2):
    6. 12.6 Watching Retailer (3):
  13. 13 2005年10月
    1. 13.1 賣掉晶門:
    2. 13.2 短談毅力工業:
    3. 13.3 短談I.T:
    4. 13.4 短談蒙牛:
    5. 13.5 久違了的公司研究:
    6. 13.6 十月好書推介:
    7. 13.7 晶門05Q3評論:
    8. 13.8 短談太平洋恩利:
    9. 13.9 思捷與利豐價格預測:
    10. 13.10 行業特質:
    11. 13.11 品牌定律:
    12. 13.12 論品牌等級及其競爭戰略:
  14. 14 2005年9月
    1. 14.1 物流
    2. 14.2 我對企業定價的觀點:
    3. 14.3 當財富效應遇上心理學:
    4. 14.4 晶門05年上半年業績評論:
    5. 14.5 7-11的消費心理學:

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